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AND PRACTICE OF THE 1996 AMENDMENTS TO THE
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S. JASON BALETSA
[The law glave me a weapon. In other words, a-a sovereign country
has the right to launch Tomahawk missiles at another country to protect
its rights.... I don't have that kind of power. I don't have $60 million
to launch those kinds of missiles. But now I have something that's
purely American. I have-I have American jurisdiction over the people
who sponsored the terrorist attack which killed Alisa.
Stephen Flatowl
INTRODUCTION
In April 1995, a terrorist van packed with explosives collided into
a bus in Israel killing seven Israeli soldiers and one American citizen.
2
The American victim of this suicide bombing was Alisa Flatow, an un-
dergraduate student at Brandeis University.3 In a world grown far too
immune to such terrorist attacks, Stephen Flatow, Alisa's father, de-
cided not to let his daughter's death become just another example of
the turbulent peace process in the Middle East. Instead, he sought
information, hoping to provide closure and accountability for his fam-
ily's loss. With the assistance of Senator Frank Lautenberg of New Jer-
sey and the cooperation of the State Department's top counter-
tJ.D. Candidate 2000, University of Pennsylvania; B.A. 1997, University of Pennsyl-
vania. I would like to thank Professor Harry Reicher for his comments and sugges-
tions. I am indebted to Executive EditorJoann Yeh, Comments Editors Phyllis Staub
and Amy Cuthrell, and all of the Associate Editors of the University of Pennsylvania Law
Review for their hard work and dedication.
60 Minutes. In Memory of Alisa (CBS television broadcast, Oct. 4, 1998), available
in LEXIS, News, Transcripts, CBS News Transcripts [hereinafter60 Minutes].
2 See Gaza Bombing Victim Buried in New Jersey, WASH. POST, Apr. 13, 1995, at A24;
Michael Kranish, Use of Nations' Frozen Assets Poses Problem, BOSTON GLOBE, June 9,
1998, at Al.
3 See Bella English, For Brandeis, Lost Innocence, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 12, 1995, at 29
(reporting the effect of the news on fellow Brandeis students).
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terrorism task force, Stephen Flatow obtained the identity of his
daughter's killer. To his surprise, the party ultimately responsible for
the attack was not a person or group, but rather a nation-the Islamic
Republic of Iran.
Outraged by this revelation, Stephen Flatow needed to take ac-
don. The Flatow family, however, in their pursuit to hold Iran ac-
countable for Alisa's death, faced the ultimate David-and-Goliath chal-
lenge. What course of action could one family possibly take to hold a
sovereign nation accountable for a terrorist attack? The answer-they
sued Iran.
Requiring a sovereign nation to appear before domestic courts is
not an easy task, but the Flatows were able to assert jurisdiction over
Iran pursuant to recent amendments to the Foreign Sovereign Immu-
nities Act of 1976 ("FSIA"). 5 The first amendment, embedded in the
Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"),
6
withdraws the cloak of sovereign immunity for foreign nations that
sponsor acts of terrorism and permits the attachment of the foreign
4 Stephen Flatow and the State Department"traced funds from Iran, bank by bank,
account number by account number, to the terrorist organization [the Shiqaqi faction
of the Palestine IslamicJihadl." 60 Minutes, supra note 1. The Flatows then obtained
copies of the Iranian budget for 1992 which blatantly noted an expenditure of $20 mil-
lion to support the Palestine Islamic revolution. See id.
5 Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891
(codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-1611 (1994)).
6 Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132,
§ 221, 110 Stat. 1214, 1241 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605, 1610 (1994 & Supp. III
1997)).
This amendment provides in pertinent part:
(a) A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of
the United States or of the States in any case-
(7) not otherwise covered by paragraph (2), in which money damages are
sought against a foreign state for personal injury or death that was caused by
an act of torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage taking, or
the provision of material support or resources (as defined in section 2339A
of title 18) for such an act if such act or provision of material support is en-
gaged in by an official, employee, or agent of such foreign state while acting
within the scope of his or her office, employment, or agency, except that the
court shall decline to hear a claim under this paragraph-
(A) if the foreign state was not designated as a state sponsor of terrorism
under section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C.
App. 2405(j)) or section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22
U.S.C. [§] 2371) at the time the act occurred, unless later so designated as
a result of such act; and
(B) even if the foreign state is or was so designated, if-
(i) the act occurred in the foreign state against which the claim has
been brought and the claimant has not afforded the foreign state a rea-
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nation's assets or property in the United States for the purpose of sat-
isfying any judgment rendered against it.
8
With the shield of sovereign immunity removed, the Flatow family
brought suit against Iran pursuant to another recent amendment to
the FSIA, the Civil Liability for Acts of State-Sponsored Terrorism Act.9
This amendment, frequently referred to as the Flatow Amendment,0
creates a private cause of action against any official, employee, or
agent of a foreign state who commits any act covered by AEDPA's ter-
rorism exception to the FSIA, so long as that foreign state has been
designated a state sponsor of terrorism." Thus, AEDPA and the Fla-
tow Amendment should be read together-the Flatow Amendment
explicitly creates a private cause of action for acts that serve as the ba-
sonable opportunity to arbitrate the claim in accordance with accepted
international rules of arbitration; or
(ii) neither the claimant nor the victim was a national of the United
States (as that term is defined in section 101(a) (22) of the Immigration
and Nationality Act) when the act upon which the claim is based oc-
curred.
28 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (7) (Supp. 1111997).
8 AEDPA amended § 1610(a) to provide:
(a) The property in the United States of a foreign state, as defined in sec-
tion 1603(a) of this chapter, used for a commercial activity in the United
States, shall not be immune from attachment in aid of execution, or from
execution, upon a judgment entered by a court of the United States or of a
State after the effective date of this act, if-
(7) the judgment relates to a claim for which the foreign state is not im-
mune under section 1605 (a) (7), regardless of whether the property is or was
involved with the act upon which the claim is based.
28 U.S.C. § 1610(a) (7) (Supp. m 1997).
9 This amendment provides in pertinent part:
an [sic] official, employee, or agent of a foreign state designated as a state
sponsor of terrorism designated [sic] under section 6() of the Export Ad-
ministration Act of 1979 [section 2405(j) of the Appendix to Title 50, War
and National Defense] while acting within the scope of his or her office, em-
ployment, or agency shall be liable to a United States national or the na-
tional's legal representative for personal injury or death caused by acts of that
official, employee, or agent for which the courts of the United States may
maintain jurisdiction under section 1605 (a) (7) of title 28, United States Code,
for money damages which may include economic damages, solarium, pain
and suffering, and punitive damages if the acts were among those described in
section 1605 (a) (7).
28 U.S.C. § 1605 note (Supp. 1 1997) ("Civil Liability for Acts of State Sponsored Ter-
rorism") (citing Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appro-
priations Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, division A, tit. I, § 101 (c) [it. V, § 589], 110
Stat. 3009-172).
'0 See 60 Minutes, supra note 1 ("Congress in 1986 passed anti-terrorism legislation,
including the Flatow Amendment, which allowed victims' families to sue foreign coun-
tries that sponsor terrorists.").
" See 28 U.S.C. § 1605 note.
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sis for AEDPA's withdrawal of sovereign immunity.
While most of the initial scholarly commentary surrounding the
passage of this anti-terrorist legislation focused on AEDPA's effects on
writs of habeas corpus (Title II), the effect of these amendments on
the doctrine of sovereign immunity was for the most part over-
looked.' 2 The commentary that did exist expressed varied opinions.
Many saw this exception to sovereign immunity as "one of the crown
jewels of the Anti-Terrorism legislation""3 that would ultimately deter
future acts of terrorism and provide the closure and accountability the
victims' families needed. 4 Others, including the U.S. Department of
State, were less jubilant about the vast theoretical implications of these
amendments on the doctrine of sovereign immunity. 5
Regardless of the initial reaction, recent cases16 filed pursuant to
these amendments have added a practical dimension to the growing
discourse on combating terrorism. These cases clearly demonstrate
the failure of private suits to rectify the problem of state-sponsored
terrorism. The inability of these lawsuits to effectuate their stated
purpose, coupled with the theoretical concerns that many commenta-
tors have expressed, demonstrate that recourse to private suits for acts
of state-sponsored terrorism must be reexamined.
This Comment explores both the theoretical implications and the
practical consequences of private suits for acts of state-sponsored ter-
rorism. Part I traces the evolution of the doctrine of sovereign immu-
nity. From its early expression in judicial opinions to the emergence
of the FSIA, the evolution of sovereign immunity has been gradual
and deliberate. Part II, however, demonstrates how these recent
2 See Allan Gerson, Holding Terrorist States Accountable, WASH. TIMES, June 4, 1996,
at A15 (noting that"for all its importance, the new 'right to sue' provision has received
scant notice in the popular press," and hypothesizing that the reason for this is the
emphasis placed on the bill's provisions regarding habeas corpus relief).
13 Id.
" See id. ("It gives the victims of terrorism and their families what they desire
most-accountability, the opportunity to get the true facts out in the open and thus to
obtain closure to their own personal trials while at the same time preventing state-
sponsors of terrorism from evading responsibility.").
is See infra notes 274-77 and accompanying text (noting the State Department's
resistance to the recent amendments).
16 See, e.g., Gicippio v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 18 F. Supp. 2d 62 (D.D.G. 1998);
Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1998); Alejandre v. Republic
of Cuba, 996 F. Supp. 1239 (S.D. Fla. 1997). The most recent in this line of cases, filed
too recently for treatment in the text, is Anderson v. Islamic Republic ofIran, CA. No. 99-
0698, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3673 (D.D.C. Mar. 24, 2000).
17 See infra Part III (analyzing the practical consequences of the recent suits under
the 1996 amendments).
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amendments represent a fundamental and unwarranted deviation
from this natural progression. While these amendments, in theory,
attempt to rectify the problems that plagued private suits under the
FSIA, the recent legislation simply goes too far. Part III of this Com-
ment explores the practical consequences of private suits by examin-
ing recent cases filed pursuant to the Flatow Amendment. The emer-
gence of this new judicial procedure was initially hailed as a triumph
for those families touched by the horrors of international terrorism.
In practice, however, such suits have resulted in unenforceable judg-
ments that deny the victims' families the closure and accountability
they desperately need. Finally, Part IV concludes by arguing that the
theoretical implications of private suits, when viewed in conjunction
with the results observed in practice, suggest a reexamination of the
propriety of resorting to private suits. While such suits have high-
lighted the problem of international terrorism, they are clearly not
the solution.
I. THE GRADUAL EVOLUTION OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNrIY
A. The Genesis of Absolute Immunity: The Schooner
Exchange v. M'Faddon
State sovereign immunity has rather enigmatic doctrinal origins. 8
While one can see the emergence of this theory in the writings of
philosophical theorists such as Grotius and Vattel,19 the first discerni-
ble articulation of this theory appears in the judicial opinions of the
nineteenth century.20 Primarily, there are two areas in which the ear-
liest manifestations of sovereign immunity are most evident: the pro-
tection afforded diplomatic agents!' and cases involving foreign public
'8 See GAMAiL MOURSI BADR, STATE IMMUNITY: AN ANALYrICAL AND PROGNOSTIC
VIEW 9 (1984) ("The genesis of the doctrine of state immunity is not readily discerni-
ble....").
'D Hugo Grotius was a seventeenth-century philosopher who wrote one of the first
treatises on sovereignty, DE IURE BELLI Ac PACiS LIBRI TRES [THREE BOOKS ABOUT THE
LAW OF WAR AND PEACE] (1625). Emerick de Vattel was an eighteenth-century phi-
losopher who also illuminated the issue of state sovereignty in LE DROrr DES GENS, OU
PRINCIPES DE LA LoI NATURELLE, APPUQUi.S A LA CONDULT ET AUX AFFAIRES DES
NATIONS ET DES SOUVERAINS [THE LAW OF NATIONS OR THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL
LAw APPLIED TO THE CONDUcT AND TO THE AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND SOVEREIGNS]
(1758). For a discussion of the importance of these philosophers to the development
of state immunity, see BADR, supra note 18, at 9-12.
See BADR, supra note 18, at 9 ("[T]he rules of state immunity... have derived
mainly from thejudicial practice of individual nations since the nineteenth century.").
21 See CHARLEsJ. LEWIS, STATE AND DIPLOMATIC IMMUNnIY 20 (2d ed. 1985) ("The
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ships.2 In both scenarios, courts embraced an absolute theory of im-
munity which acknowledged that "all states are equal and that no one
state may exercise authority over any other state. "23
American courts, in The Schooner Exchange v. MFaddon,24 took the
lead in delineating the doctrine of absolute sovereign immunity.2 In
this case, the French navy captured the schooner Exchange, owned by
John McFaddon and his partner, William Greetham, on the high seas
26and converted it into the French ship-of-war, the Balaou. Due to in-
clement weather, the Balaou was forced to enter the port of Philadel-
phia. While in U.S. territory, McFaddon and Greetham filed suit in
federal court claiming that they were the sole owners of the vessel and
that she was "violently and forcibly taken by certain persons, acting
under the decrees and orders of Napoleon, Emperor of the French."
2 7
Chief Justice John Marshall, while noting that "It]he jurisdiction
of the nation within its own territory is necessarily exclusive and abso-
lute,",2 wrote that in a world "composed of distinct sovereign [s], pos-
sessing equal rights and equal independence,"2 the jurisdiction of one
sovereign "would not seem to contemplate foreign sovereigns, nor
doctrine of sovereign immunity found its earliest manifestation in the protection af-
forded to diplomatic agents.").
2 See BADR, supra note 18, at 16-18 (summarizing early admiralty cases raising the
issue of sovereign immunity).
2 Louis HENEIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAw: CASES AND MATERIALS 1126 (Sd ed.
1993).
24 11 U.S. (7Cranch) 116 (1812).
25 This is not to suggest that the United States was alone in developing the theory
of absolute immunity. The Supreme Court of France stated that "[t]he reciprocal in-
dependence of states is one of the most universally respected principles of interna-
tional law, and it follows as a result therefore that a government cannot be subjected to
the jurisdiction of another against its will .... " Spanish Government v. Lambege et
Pujol, D. 1849, at 1, 5, 9, translated and excerpted in BARRY E. CARTER & PHI& .
TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAw 588 (2d ed. 1995). The British courts also addressed
the theory of absolute immunity in The Parlement Belge. 5 P.D. 197 (1880) (Eng.). Lord
Justice Brett wrote:
As a consequence of the absolute independence of every sovereign authority,
and of the international comity which induces every sovereign state to respect
the independence and dignity of every other sovereign state, each and every
one declines to exercise by means of its Courts any of its territorial jurisdiction
over the person of any sovereign ....
Id. at 214-15. For further discussion of the international development of absolute im-
munity, see JOSEPH M. SWEENEY, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF
SovERmIGN IMMuNnIY 20-21 (1963).
16 See Schooner Exdange, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 117 (setting forth the facts of the
dispute).
2 Id. at 116.
2 Id. at 136.
29 Id.
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their sovereign fights as its objects." Thus, a foreign sovereign, equal
in rights and independence to any other, enters the territory of an-
other sovereign "only under an express license, or in the confidence
that the immunities belonging to his independent sovereign sta-
don... are reserved by implication, and will be extended to him."31
Having articulated this theoretical basis of sovereign immunity, Mar-
shall applied it to the present case and concluded that an armed ship
in the service of a foreign sovereign "must be considered as having
come into the American territory, under an implied promise, that
while necessarily within it... she should be exempt from the jurisdic-
tion of the country."3'2 Thus, the French government was immune
from jurisdiction, and Marshall dismissed the case.
While there were many early attempts to limit the absolute immu-
nity doctrine, few were successful. In Berizzi Bros. v. Steamship Pesaro,"
the district court seized upon language in Marshall's opinion in
Schooner Exchange to deny immunity for a foreign ship that was en-
gaged in a commercial activity.3 Upon review, the Supreme Courtss
resisted limiting the absolute immunity doctrine and instead found
that "merchant ships held and used by a government [in this case,
Italy] ... must be held to have the same immunity as war ships, in the
absence of a treaty or statute of the United States evincing a different
purpose."16 While this attempt to restrict the absolute immunity doc-
trine failed, it did demonstrate that some restrictions were needed
and foreshadowed their ultimate inevitability.
B. Movement from Absolute to Restrictive Immunity: The Tate Letter
Although one could hear rumblings of discontent in the judiciary,
the first gradual deviation from the absolute doctrine came from the
Id. at 137.
s Id.
s2 Id. at 147.
277 F. 473 (S.D.N.Y. 1921).
In his opinion, Marshall stated: "Without indicating any opinion on this ques-
tion, it may safely be affirmed, that there is a manifest distinction between the private
property of the person who happens to be a prince, and that military force which sup-
ports the sovereign power and maintains the dignity and independence of a nation."
SchwonerExchange, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 145. Thus, while not serving as the basis for
the decision here, this dictum articulates the restrictive theory of immunity, which
would eventually replace the absolute theory 140 years later.
See Berrizzi Bros. v. S.S. Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562 (1926).
Id. at 574.
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executive branch through the Tate Letter. Jack Tate, serving as legal
advisor to the State Department in 1952, wrote a letter to the Attorney
General advising the United States to adopt a more restrictive theory
of sovereign immunity that dichotomized acts into jure imperii [public
acts] and jure gestionis [private acts].-" Tate argued that the public acts
of the sovereign should retain immunity in U.S. courts but that other
private commercial acts should be subject to Americanjurisdicton.
Tate advocated this approach for several reasons. First, he sur-
veyed the various approaches of other nations and noted that several
nations, including Belgium, Italy, France, Austria, Greece, Switzer-
land, and Egypt, had already adopted the restrictive theory4 0 Second,
Tate reasoned that the United States placed itself and its citizens at a
disadvantage by waiving sovereign immunity in foreign courts while
providing immunity for foreign sovereigns in domestic courts.4' Fi-
nally, Tate claimed that the increased commercialization of the world
market, with nations themselves engaging in commercial activities,
necessitated subjecting these nations to domestic jurisdiction so that
41
any dispute would be within the purview of the courts.
37 Changed Policy Concerning the Granting of Sovereign Immunity to Foreign
Governments, May 19, 1952, DEP'T ST. BuLL., June 1952, at 984 [hereinafter Tate Let-
ter].
33 See id. (distinguishing this restrictive theory of immunity from "the classical or
absolute theory of sovereign immunity, [which holds] a sovereign cannot, without his
consent, be made a respondent in the courts of another sovereign").
39 See id. ("[T]he immunity of the sovereign is recognized with regard to sovereign
or public acts.., of a state, but not with respect to private acts.").
40 See id. ("The... restrictive theory... has always been supported by... Belgium
and Italy. It was adopted in ... Egypt and . .. Switzerland.... France and Austria
[adopted it] in the 20's.... Rumania, Peru, and... Denmark also appear to follow
this theory.").
41
[T]he granting of sovereign immunity to foreign governments in the courts of
the United States is most inconsistent with the action of the Government of
the United States in subjecting itself to suit ... and with its long established
policy of not claiming immunity in foreign jurisdictions for its merchant ves-
sels.
See id. at 985.
42 See id ("[W] idespread and increasing activity on the part of governments of en-
gaging in commercial activities makes necessary a practice which will enable persons
doing business with them to have their rights determined in the courts."); see also David
MacKusick, Comment, Human Rights vs. Sovereign Rights: The State Sponsored Terrorism
Exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 10 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 741, 752 (1996)
(noting that the era of laissez-faire economics which thrived in the late nineteenth
century was replaced by the "re-entry of the state into the marketplace, and most nota-
bly, the emergence of socialist states with state trading companies"). As a result, it be-
came profoundly unfair to subject "a private trader to legal responsibility while grant-
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Translating the restrictive theory into practice proved to be prob-
lematic for American courts, which had trouble distinguishing be-
tween public and private acts.4 As a result, the decision where to draw
the line between public and private was left to the State Department.
A foreign state would "request[] the State Department to ask the De-
partment ofJustice to make a 'suggestion of immunity' to the court."4
The Supreme Court held that such a suggestion would be given great
deference since it represented "'a conclusive determination by the po-
litical arm of the Government' that proceeding with the suit 'inter-
feres with the proper conduct of our foreign relations."'o
Although to many the Tate Letter represented formal acceptance of
the restrictive theory of immunity, some commentators contend that
the case law following the issuance of the Tate Letter does not reflect
such a doctrinal shift. 6 Not only was the reluctance to accept the the-
ory reflected in the case law, but the actions of the United States, in
defending itself in foreign courts, demonstrate that full allegiance to
the restrictive theory would not occur for at least thirty years.4 The
transformation from absolute to restrictive sovereign immunity thus
progressed gradually until formal codification of the restrictive theory
in 1976.
ing immunity to a government engaged in the same transaction." Id.
43 SeeM. Scott Bucci, Comment, Breaking Through the Immunity Wall?: Implications of
the Terrorism Exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 3J. INT'L LEGAL STUD. 293,
299 (1997) ("The federal courts had difficulty distinguishing between the two catego-
ries." (citing Margot C. Wuebbels, Commercial Terrorism A Commercial Activity Exception
Under §1605(a)(2) of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 35 ARIZ. L. REv. 1123, 1130
(1993))).
4 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES,
pt. IV, ch. 5, introductory note (1986).
" Id. (quoting Ex parle Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 588-89 (1943)); see also Re-
public of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 35-36 (1945) (recognizing judicial defer-
ence to the State Department to define the limits of sovereign immunity).
46 See BAD, supra note 18, at 54 (noting that prior to 1976 and the enactment of
the FSIA, the case law does not reflect a complete shift from absolute to restrictive im-
munity).
47 The House Report to the FSIA demonstrates that in the 1950s, the United States
would instruct foreign counsel to plead sovereign immunity in every case. In the
1960s, the United States abandoned this approach in countries that had already
adopted the restrictive principle but invoked absolute immunity in those countries that
did not. Finally, in the 1970s, the United States, regardless of the foreign forum's pol-
icy, did not invoke absolute immunity abroad in instances where the United States,
pursuant to the Tate Letter, would not recognize a foreign state's immunity in domestic
courts. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 9 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604,
6608.
20001 1255
1256 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREViEW [Vol. 148:1247
C. Codiflcation of Restrictivelmmunity: The Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act of 1976
The problems that persuaded the United States to accept the re-
strictive theory in the 1950s were further exacerbated in the 1970s.
Due to the increasing globalization of American interests, Congress
needed clear legal standards that signified formal recognition of the
restrictive theory and placed the United States on even footing with
other nations.48 This was the main objective of the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act of 1976.49
During hearings surrounding the passage of the FSIA, Monroe
Leigh, the legal adviser of the U.S. Department of State, highlighted
the problems of applying a non-statutory-based, restrictive theory of
sovereign immunity. Leigh argued that the granting of sovereign im-
munity at the behest of those foreign nations that request suggestions
of immunity from the Justice Department was an inefficient and prob-
lematic system. 0 Furthermore, the United States, although providing
recourse to diplomatic concerns for other countries subject to suit in
domestic courts, could not avail itself of similar treatment abroad
since "[i]n virtually every other country in the world, sovereign im-
munity is a question of international law decided exclusively by the
courts and not by institutions concerned with foreign affairs. '
Leigh also noted that the lack of any clear acceptance of the re-
strictive theory of sovereign immunity created problems for private
citizens engaged in international commerce.52 Leigh argued that the
's See Jurisdiction of U.S. Courts in Suits Against Foreign States: Hearings on H. R 11315
Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Law and Governmental Relations of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 94th Cong. 24, 26-27 (1976) (statement of Monroe Leigh, Legal Advisor, U.S.
Department of State) [hereinafter Leigh Testimony] (articulating his dissatisfaction with
the consequences of the Tate Letter).
49 See Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 612 (1992) (stating that
"the [Foreign Sovereign Immunities] Act... largely codifies the so-called 'restrictive'
theory of foreign sovereign immunity first endorsed by the State Department in
1952"); see also The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: Hearing on S. 825 Before the Subcomm.
on Courts and Admin. Practice of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciay, 103d Cong. 12 (1994)
(statement of Jamison S. Borek, Deputy Legal Advisor, U.S. Department of State)
[hereinafter Borek Statement] (noting that the primary objective of the FSIA was "to cod-
ify the 'restrictive' principle of sovereign immunity as recognized in international
law").
'o See Leigh Testimony, supra note 48, at 26-27 (pinpointing the various considera-
tions of leaving the diplomatic initiative to the foreign state).
'" Id. at 27.
-2 See id. (urging Congress to adopt the FSIA in order to provide uniformity and
certainty to a growing number of private citizens who conduct business with foreign
nations). Leigh reasoned that "when the foreign state enters the marketplace or when
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lack of formal standards for granting immunity might deny a private
citizen a legal remedy in domestic courts since "[h]e cannot be en-
tirely certain that the ordinary legal dispute will not be artificially
raised to the level of a diplomatic problem through the government's
intercession with the State Department."53 Thus, Congress passed the
FSIA in order to replace ad hoc case-by-case diplomatic determina-
tions and to provide private citizens with recourse to a domestic forum
for a determination of their legal disputes with foreign nations.-"
Once signed into law, the FSIA became the sole means of exercis-
ing jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign in the United States.55 The
basic premise of the FSIA is that the restrictive theory of sovereign
immunity applies to all suits brought against foreign nations. 6 While
the Tate letter argued for immunity based upon the distinction be-
tween public versus private acts, the FSIA states that foreign nations
are presumptively immune from American jurisdiction unless the al-
leged act falls within one of the narrowly-tailored exceptions.57 The
exceptions from immunity, as originally enacted, included explicit
and implicit waivers of immunity; commercial activity which directly or
indirectly affects the United States; expropriation; property claims;
noncommercial torts; admiralty claims; counterclaims; and interna-
tional agreements."' Thus, through the FSIA's limited and carefully
enumerated exceptions, the theory of sovereign immunity gradually
it acts as a private party, there is nojustification in modem international law for allow-
ing the foreign state to avoid the economic costs of the agreements which it may
breach or the acddents which it may cause." Id.
5 I.
-4 See H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 7 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6606
(stating that an important purpose of the FSIA "is to transfer the determination of sov-
ereign immunity from the executive branch to the judicial branch, thereby reducing
the foreign policy implications of immunity determinations and assuring litigants that
these often crucial decisions are made on purely legal grounds and under procedures
that insure due process").
'5 See id. at 12 (stating that the FSIA "sets forth the sole and exclusive standards to
be used in resolving questions of sovereign immunity raised by foreign states before
Federal and State courts in the United States"); see also Argentine Republic v. Amerada
Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 443 (1989) (noting that after passage of the FSIA,
neither the Alien Torts Claims Act nor any other federal statute may serve as the basis
forjurisdiction against a foreign state).
56 SeeVerlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 488 (1983) (explaining
that "[f]or the most part, the Act codifies, as a matter of federal law, the restrictive
theory of sovereign immunity").
57 See 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (1994 & Supp. HI 1997) (stating that "a foreign state shall
be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States and of the States
except as provided in sections 1605 to 1607 of this chapter").
' See id. § 1605 (enumerating the exceptions to sovereign immunity claims).
20001 1257
1258 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW [Vol. 148:1247
evolved from absolute to restrictive.
1. The Non-Commercial Tort Exception and Private Suits
for Acts of Terrorism
The "non-commercial tort exception" provides that a sovereign
nation is not immune from suit where money damages are sought
against that foreign nation for personal injury or death, or damage to
or loss of property. These limitations on immunity require further
that such incidents occur in the United States and be caused by the
tortious act or omission of the foreign state or of any official or em-
ployee of the foreign state while acting within the scope of his office
or employment.9
While the legislative history suggests that the non-commercial tort
exception was "directed primarily at the problem of traffic acci-
dents," 60 many private litigants claimed this section as the jurisdic-
tional basis for private civil suits alleging terrorist activity. The non-
commercial tort exception, however, has jurisdictional limitations that
drastically limit its application to acts of state-sponsored terrorism.
The most severe limitation of the non-commercial tort exception
is that it provides liability for non-commercial torts only when the tort
occurs, in its entirety, in the United States.6' Therefore, if the alleged
tortious conduct occurred in the defendant state, foreign territory, or
international waters, a litigant cannot avail himself of this exception to
the FSIA.62 Although such a territorial requirement "is not clear from
'9 See id. § 1605(a) (5).
6 Borek Statement, supra note 49, at 13 ("The purpose of section 1605 (a) (5) [was] to
permit the victim of a-traffic accident or other noncommercial tort to maintain an ac-
tion against the foreign state to the extent otherwise provided by law."); see also
CHRISTOPH H. SCHREUER, STATE IMMUNrIY. SOME RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 44 (1988)
(noting that "[tihe torts exception was meant to cover situations like motor or other
accidents").
61 See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (5) (stating that liability is possible when "money dam-
ages are sought against a foreign state for personal injury or death, or damage to or
loss of property, occu7ringin the United State" (emphasis added)).
62 See Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 710-11 (9th Cir.
1992) (discussing the requirement of "direct effect" in the United States); Persinger v.
Islamic Republic of Iran, 729 F.2d 835, 839 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (holding that tortious
conduct committed on the grounds of a U.S. embassy does not qualify for relief under
FSIA); McKeel v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 722 F.2d 582, 587 (9th Cir. 1983) ("Under
the FSIA, sovereign immunity is waived in suits [for damages] occu7ring in the United
States.") (citation and internal quotation omitted); see also Gerson, supra note 12,
("[U]nless the act occurred within the territorial confines of the United States the ter-
rorist state could, in effect, admit culpability and walk away from any accountability.").
But see Frolova v. USSR, 761 F.2d 370, 379-80 (7th Cir. 1985) (noting that although
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the language of the statute,"Os most courts have relied upon the House
Report, which explicitly states that the alleged tortious activity must
have occurred in the United States, in finding that such a require-
ment exists.64
The case of Smith v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya
s pro-
vides perhaps the most devastating example of the inability of the
FSIA to accommodate private suits for acts of terrorism. This case was
one of a barrage of lawsuits filed in the aftermath of the bombing of
Pan Am Flight 103.6 The named plaintiffs in the suit, Bruce Smith
and Paul Hudson, who both lost their wives in the bombing, claimed
that Libya sponsored the attack despite adamant denials by the Libyan
government. Libya filed a motion to dismiss the case, claiming
(among other things) that the United States lacked jurisdiction over it
based upon the tenets of sovereign immunity as outlined in the FSIA.6s
The district court agreed with Libya's jurisdiction argument and dis-
there is sovereign immunity for activities wholly outside American territory, if such ac-
tivity has a "direct effect in the United States," such immunity is waived).
63 MacKusick, supra note 42, at 754.
" See H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 21 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.-A.N. 6604,
6619 ("[T]he tortious act or omission must occur within the jurisdiction of the United
States"). The Supreme Court addressed the issue of the territorial restriction of the
non-commercial tort exception in Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488
U.S. 428 (1989). In this case, a Liberian oil tanker, chartered by Amerada Hess, was
attacked in international waters by Argentinean aircraft. Stating that "the FSIA pro-
vides the sole basis for obtainingjurisdiction over a foreign state" and finding that "re-
spondents' injury unquestionably occurred well outside the 3-mile limit then in effect
for the territorial waters of the United States," the Supreme Court held that "the ex-
ception for noncommercial torts cannot apply" and dismissed the complaint for lack of
jurisdiction. Id. at 439, 441.
886 F. Supp. 306 (E.D.N.Y. 1995). For a complete analysis of the background of
this case and its implications for sovereign immunity, see Leslie McKay, Comment, A
New Take on Antitearorism: Smith v. Socialist People's Libyan ArabJamahiriya, 13 AM. U.
INT'LL. REV. 439,449-54 (1997).
6 SeeToni Locy, Families SuingLibya overPan Am Blast WASH. POST, May 7, 1996, at
A1S (noting the various lawsuits that were filed in the aftermath of the bombing).
While more than 10 years have passed since Pan Am Flight 103 exploded over Locker-
bie, Scotland, there has been little closure for victims' families. See Mitch Stacy, Locker-
bie Victims Mourned 10 Years After, Cm. SuN-TIMES, Dec. 21, 1998, at 12 (pointing out
that 10 years after the explosion, Libyan suspects had yet to be handed over for trial).
67 See Smith, 886 F. Supp. at 309 (quoting allegations from the complaints of Smith
and Hudson); McKay, supra note 65, at 441 ("Maintaining that it condemns all terrorist
activities, Libya... firmly denies any connection with the Pan Am bombing.") (citation
omitted).
's See Smith, 886 F. Supp. at 309 (outlining Libya's argument for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction based upon the FSIA and customary principles of international
law).
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missed the case.69
The plaintiffs appealed the case to the Second Circuit.7 In order
to overcome the jurisdictional obstacle, the plaintiffs attempted to
employ four variations of the FSIA.
(1) implied waiver of immunity under the FSIA arising from Libya's al-
leged participation in actions that violate jus cogens norms; (2) implied
waiver of immunity under the FSIA arising from Libya's alleged guaranty
of any damage judgment against defendants al-Megrahi and Fhima; (3)
the occurrence of the bombing on "territory" of the United States; and
(4) the argument that Libya's immunity conflicts with the United Na-
tions Charter.
7 1
The Second Circuit was not persuaded by any of these claims and
affirmed the lower court's dismissal of the action.7 The amalgam of
claims the plaintiffi were forced to raise in order to assert a claim
against Libya shows how poorly the FSIA covered acts of state-
sponsored terrorism.? Unless the plaintiff managed to neatly fit his
claim within one of the enumerated exceptions, the claim was
barred.74
6' The Smith court concluded:
Although Libya's alleged participation, if true, in this tragedy is outrageous
and reprehensible ... this Court may not rightly obtainjurisdiction over Libya
for the purposes of these private rights of action. Libya's alleged terrorist ac-
tions do not fall within the enumerated exceptions to the [FSIA] and there-
fore Libya must be accorded sovereign immunity from suit.
Id. at 315.
70 See Smith v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 101 F.3d 239 (2d Cir.
1996).
7, McKay, supra note 65, at 449-50; see also Smith, 101 F.3d at 242-46 (analyzing the
merits of the four claims).
72 See Smith, 101 F.3d at 247.
7 See Bucci, supra note 43, at 313 (claiming that prior to AEDPA, "victims had to
shape their claim so that it could be pigeonholed into one of the existing exceptions to
the FSIA," and noting that "rarely were these efforts successful").
74 Furthermore, the court created an even greater obstacle to pursuing private suits
for acts of state-sponsored terrorism through the FSIA by stating that Congress did not
intend the FSIA to be used as a sword to pierce the veil of sovereign immunity in this
context. Instead, the court felt as if the response to terrorist activity was properly
placed within the purview of the executive and legislative branches. See Smith, 101 F.3d
at 244 ("Congress may well have expected the response to such violations to come
from the political branches of the Government, which are not powerless to penalize a
foreign state for international terrorism."). Thus, the precedential authority of Smith
became an obstacle to future private suits.
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2. The Recent Amendments to the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act
As a result of the dismissal of the Smith case,"' recent incidents of
terrorism such as the Oklahoma City bombing,76 and persuasive lobby-
ing by Senator Frank Lautenberg and the Flatow family,77 Congress
drastically amended the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. By re-
moving the cloak of sovereign immunity for acts of state-sponsored
terrorism, and by specifically providing for private rights of action, the
1996 amendments greatly enhance the ability of a private litigant to
subject a foreign sovereign to domesticjurisdiction.
The first amendment to the FSIA was enacted as part of the Anti-
Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA").78 This
Act amends the FSIA in two distinct ways. First, it provides that na-
tions designated as state sponsors of terrorism are not immune from
civil suits in U.S. courts for terrorist acts they commit, or direct to be
committed, against American citizens or nationals outside of the for-
eign state's territory.9 This new exemption attempts to rectify the
problem the non-commercial tort exception created in cases such as
Smith. In order to qualify under AEDPA's exemption, the alleged act
of state-sponsored terrorism need not have any territorial nexus to the
See H.R. REP. No. 105-48, at 2 (1997) (noting that the addition of the state-
sponsored terrorism exception [§ 1605(a) (7)] was the direct result of the "revelation
that the Libyan government assisted in blowing up Pan Am 103 over Lockerbie, Scot-
land" and the failure of the current FSIA to provide a proper redress); see alsojohn F.
Murphy, Foreign Claims, 32 INT'L LAW. 453, 455 (1998) ("The frustrations of the plain-
tiffs in the Smith case... provided the political momentum that led to the revisions to
the FSIA contained in the [AEDPA].").
76 See Statement on Signing the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996, 1996 PUB. PAPERS 630 (Apr. 24, 1996) ("After the tragedy in Oklahoma City, I
asked Federal law enforcement agencies to reassess their needs and determine which
tools would help them meet the new challenge of domestic terrorism. They produced,
and I transmitted to the Congress, the 'Antiterrorism Amendments Act of 1995' in May
1995."); see also 141 CONG. REC. H4600 (daily ed. May 9, 1995) (statement of Rep. Fox)
(noting that the House proposed amendments to the FSIA in response to the Okla-
homa City bombing).
77 See 60 Minutes, supra note 1 (discussing Senator Lautenberg's involvement and
the Flatow family's lobbying of Congress for anti-terrorism legislation).
78 For a thorough examination of the legislative history of the AEDPA, see Roberta
Smith, Note, America Tries to Come to Terms with Terrorism" The United States Anti-Terrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 v. British Anti-Terrorism Law and International Re-
sponse, 5 CARDOZOJ. INT'L & COMp. L. 249, 261-77 (1997).
See H.R. REP. No. 104-383, at 62 (1995) (noting that the amendment would allow
"suits in the federal courts against countries responsible for terrorist acts where Ameri-
cans and/or their loved ones suffer injury or death at the hands of the terrorist
states"). For the complete text of AEDPA's amendment to the FSIA, see supra note 8.
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United States. Second, AEDPA amended § 1610(a) of the FSIA to
permit the attachment of property or assets of a foreign state in the
United States in order to satisfy a 'Judgment relat[ed] to a claim for
which the foreign state is not immune under section 1605(a) (7), re-
gardless of whether the property is or was involved with the act upon
which the claim is based."80
While AEDPA's provisions provide that a sovereign will not enjoy
immunity from suit where the nation either caused or sponsored
death or personal injury in a terrorist attack, there are several impor-
tant limitations that must be noted. First, only claims for personal in-
jury or death are covered by these amendments. 8' Any claim for dam-
aged property or economic loss is beyond the scope of this
amendment. Second, a litigant may only bring claims against nations
that have been designated by the State Department as sponsors of ter-
rorism.82 Thus, at the present time, only Cuba, Iraq, Iran, Libya,
North Korea, Sudan, and Syria are subject to this amendment.8 3 All
other nations, even if they engage in similar activities, presumably re-
tain their sovereign immunity. Finally, even if the foreign state is des-
ignated by the State Department as a state sponsor of terrorism, the
court will decline to exercise its jurisdiction if the "act occurred in the
foreign state against which the claim has been brought and the claim-
ant has not afforded the foreign state a reasonable opportunity to ar-
bitrate the claim, " 4 or if neither the claimant nor the victim was a "na-
tional of the United States ... when the act upon which the claim is
based occurred.""
The addition of a state-sponsored terrorism exception to the FSIA
represented the first "successful expansion of exceptions to sovereign
immunity in 30 years."86 It was not, however, the final revision. Within
80 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a) (7) (Supp. III 1997).
81 See id. § 1605(a)(7) (limiting recovery to cases "in which money damages are
sought against a foreign state for personal injury or death" (emphasis added)).
82 See id. § 1605 (a) (7) (A) (requiring the court to decline to hear a claim under the
statute "if the foreign state was not designated as a state sponsor of terrorism under
60) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 or section 620A of the Foreign Assis-
tance Act of 1961").
See Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement: Terrorist Countries, 59
Fed. Reg. 51,130, 51,131 (1994) (to be codified at 48 C.F.R. pt. 252) (proposed Oct. 7,
1994).
84 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (a) (7) (B) (i).
'5 Id. § 1605(a)(7)(B)(ii). The term "national of the United States" is defined in
§ 1101(a) (22) of the Immigration and NationalityAct, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101 (West 1999).
"Naomi Roht-Arriaza, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and Human Rights Viola-
tions: One Step Fonoard, Two Steps Back, 16 BERKELEYJ. INT'L L. 71, 82 (1998).
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one year, another act would also alter the evolution of sovereign im-
munity. Alisa Flatow's tragic death was the catalyst for a second piece
of legislation, the Civil Liability for Acts of State Sponsored Terrorism
Act. With the shield of sovereign immunity removed, the Flatow
family sought to hold Iran accountable for Alisa's death and impose a
substantive sanction against Iran through monetary remuneration8a
The Flatow Amendment imposes the possibility of massive civil li-
ability by providing for recovery for non-economic harms, such as so-
latium damages and pain and suffering, as well as punitive damages
against an "official, employee, or agent of a foreign state designated as
a state sponsor of terrorism."" As noted by Professors Glannon and
Atik, the language of this amendment does not state specifically
whether or not the foreign states themselves are subject to liability for
violations of § 1605(a) (7). Yet, several courts have interpreted this
amendment, like the noncommercial tort exception, as establishing
joint and several liability that extends to the state itself through the
doctrines of respondeat superior and vicarious liability.
9
28 U.S.C. § 1605 note (Supp. M 1997) ("Civil Liability for Acts of State Spon-
sored Terrorism") (citing Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Pro-
grams Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, division A, tit. I, § 101(c) [tit.
V, § 589], 110 Stat. 3009-172). For the text of the Flatow Amendment, see supra note 9
(providing liability for state officials who act in their official capacity in sponsoring ter-
rorism).
as See generally Gerson, supra note 12, at A15 (discussing the potential effect of civil
damage awards in curbing terrorist sponsorship).
"9 28 U.S.C. § 1605 note.
go SeeJoseph W. Glannon &Jeffrey Atik, Politics and PersonalJurisdiction: Suing State
Sponsors of Terrorism Under the 1996 Amendments to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 87
GEo. LJ. 675, 676 n.5 (1999) ("It is not clear whether the foreign state itself is subject
to liability under the Act.").
91 This theory was accepted in Liu v. Republic of China, 892 F.2d 1419 (9th Cir.
1989). In this case, the widow of a man killed by an individual acting under orders of
Taiwan's Defense Intelligence Bureau brought suit against Taiwan for damages. The
Ninth Circuit held that the district court erred in deciding that the foreign sovereign
could not be held liable under respondeat superior because the individual's act was
not committed within the scope of his employment. See id. at 1434 (holding that the
act of state doctrine does not prevent sovereign liability under California's law of re-
spondeat superior). The district court for the Southern District of Florida, in Alejandre
v. Republic of Cuba, 996 F. Supp. 1239 (S.D. Fla. 1997), reached the same result with
regard to the Flatow Amendment. The court noted that "[i]f plaintiffs prove an
agent's liability under this Act, the foreign state employing the agent would also incur
liability under the theory of respondeat superior." Id. at 1249 (citing Skeen v. Federa-
tive Republic of Brazil, 566 F. Supp. 1414, 1417 (D.D.C. 1983)).
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II. THE THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE 1996 AMENDMENTS
Part I of this Comment traced the evolution of sovereign immu-
nity from the early manifestations of absolute immunity to the recent
amendments to the FSIA. If one were to place this evolution on a
continuum, a clear and logical progression would emerge. The transi-
tion from absolute to restrictive immunity was gradual and reflected
several practical and international concerns.92 Furthermore, uncodi-
fled acceptance of the restrictive theory proved unworkable over time
and gradually persuaded Congress to enact the FSIA, which provided
limited and narrowly-drawn exceptions to the presumption of immu-
nity.
93
Despite this gradual and methodical progression, the FSIA has
undergone a drastic transformation within the past three years. Not-
withstanding the recent amendments' laudable intentions, from a
theoretical perspective, these acts represent an unjustified deviation
from the gradual evolution of sovereign immunity. When Congress
enacted the FSIA, it did so in a way that "reflect[ed] both the political
sensitivity and the legal complexity in the area of foreign sovereign
immunity."94 Although the amendments attempt to rectify the prob-
lems that plagued private suits for acts of terrorism, the new legisla-
tion does not reflect the same thoughtful inquiry that preceded the
FSIA. By removing the jurisdictional nexus requirement, ignoring
due process concerns, and creating additional substantive causes of
actions, the 1996 amendments represent an unwarranted departure
from traditional international and American jurisprudence regarding
sovereign immunity.
A. The Nexus Requirement and Jurisdiction
Public international law traditionally recognizes three types ofju-
risdiction.95 First, jurisdiction to prescribe (prescriptive jurisdiction)
encompasses "the authority of a state to make its substantive law appli-
9' See supra Part I.B (describingJack Tate's reasoning for the transition from abso-
lute to restrictive immunity and the gradual acceptance of restrictive immunity by the
United States in actions brought against it).
93 See supra Part I.C (arguing that the adoption of the FSIA was a deliberate attempt
to codify the doctrine of restrictive immunity with narrow and circumscribed excep-
tions).
94 Borek Statement, supra note 49, at 12.
" See RESTATEMENT, supra note 44, § 401 (1986) (providing for three types ofju-
risdiction: jurisdiction to prescribe, jurisdiction to adjudicate, and jurisdiction to en-
force).
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cable to persons or activities." 0 Second, jurisdiction to adjudicate (ad-
judicatory jurisdiction) provides "the authority of a state to subject
particular persons or things to its judicial process." 7 Finally, jurisdic-
tion to enforce (enforcement jurisdiction) authorizes "a state to use
the resources of government to induce or compel compliance with its
law." 8 In analyzing Congress's ability to enact the recent amendments
to the FSIA, it is necessary to examine Congress's basis of prescriptive
jurisdiction.
1. TerritorialJurisdiction and the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
Although international law recognizes five bases for prescribing
jurisdictionS-territory,'° nationality,
01 the protective principle,10 2
passive personality,0 3 and the universal principle -Congress pur-
posefully employed territorial jurisdiction in almost all the exceptions
to the FSIA, as originally enacted.0 " The decision to limit the FSIA's
Id. pt. IV, introductory note, at 231.
9 id.
9 id.
See CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 25, at 728 (enunciating the traditional bases
of prescriptivejurisdiction).
'0 Territorial jurisdiction is the exclusive authority of a state to regulate within its
territory. See id. at 737 (defining this theory as providing each state the exclusive
authority to regulate in its territory and no authority to regulate outside its territory).
101 Nationality jurisdiction is commonly referred to as "[t]he right of a state to
regulate the conduct of its citizens or nationals anywhere in the world." Id. at 760.
"2 The protective principle is based upon the assumption that "a state is entitled to
protect its security by means of the exercise of its jurisdiction." D.W. Bowett, Jurisdic-
lion: Changing Patterns of Authority over Activities and Resources, in INTERNAnONAL LAW:
CLASSIC AND CONTEMPORARY READINGS 207, 214 (Charlotte Ku & Paul F. Diehl eds.,
1998). The principle application of this jurisdiction is in respect to "political offenses
such as espionage, sedition, counterfeiting of currency, perjury in relation to official
documents.., or attacks against embassies and consulates abroad." Id.
,03 The passive personality basis ofjurisdiction "asserts that a state may apply law-
particularly criminal law-to an act committed outside its territory by a person not its
national where the victim of the act was its national." RESTATEMENT, supra note 44,
§ 402 cmt. g.
'" Universajurisdiction provides that "[a] state hasjurisdiction to define and pre-
scribe punishment for certain offenses recognized by the community of nations as of
universal concern." Id. § 404. As Rosalyn Higgins notes, "[c]ontrary to popular belief,
terrorism is not subject to universal jurisdiction-some degree of connection with the
event is required." Rosalyn Higgins, The General International Law of Terrism, in
TRRoRISM AND INTERNATIONAL LAw 13, 24 (Rosalyn Higgins & Maurice Flory eds.,
1997).
105 The commercial activity exception requires that the action is based upon a
commercial activity carried on in the United States; a related act performed in the
United States; or a related act, carried on elsewhere, that has a direct effect on the
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exceptions to actions occurring in, or having a direct effect on, the
United States was the result of careful deliberation by Congress and
the executive branch'00 which wished to ensure that the exceptions to
the presumption of sovereign immunity would not have an inequita-
ble extraterritorial application.
1 0 7
Throughout U.S. history there has been a strong presumption
against extraterritorial application of U.S. laws.!0" Justice Holmes, in
American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., noted that extraterritorial ap-
plication of law "not only would be unjust, but would be an interfer-
ence with the authority of another sovereign, contrary to the comity of
nations, which the other state concerned justly might resent... 'All
legislation is prima facie territorial.'" 109 To Justice Holmes, "it was in-
conceivable that an act of Congress would apply outside the territory
of the United States.""0 Ever since American Banana, territoriality has
been regarded as "a firmly established concomitant of the concept of
state sovereignty, and ... the most fundamental form of jurisdic-
tion.""' Although the courts, Congress, and administrative agencies
United States. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (2) (1994) (stating a general exception to the
jurisdictional immunity of a foreign state). The expropriation exception removes sov-
ereign immunity where "rights in property taken in violation of international law are in
issue and that property... is present in the United States." Id. § 1605(a)(3). Fur-
thermore, § 1605(a) (4) withdraws immunity where "rights in property in the United
States acquired by succession or gift or rights in immovable property situated in the
United States are in issue." Id. § 1605 (a) (4).
"6 See Borek Statement, supra note 49, at 12 ("In crafting the FSIA, Congress and the
Executive Branch created a carefully balanced structure that provides immunity in
some cases and exceptions to immunity in others. The statute reflects not only a rec-
ognition of the foreign relations interests involved but also a fundamental concern for
international law and practice.").
10 See The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: Hearings on S. 825 Before the Subcomm. on
Courts and Admin. Practice of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 82 (1996)
(statement of Abraham D. Sofaer, George P. Shultz Distinguished Scholar and Senior
Fellow, Hoover Institution, Stanford University) [hereinafter Sofaer Statement] (arguing
that requiring a U.S. nexus would prevent an "extra-territorial extension of the juris-
diction of our courts to adjudicate that is not warranted by international law"); see also
supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text (discussing the reluctance of federal courts
to extend the scope of the noncommercial tort exception to activities outside the
United States).
los See CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 25, at 738 ("This tendency... to apply U.S.
law extraterritorially has been sharply resisted by foreign courts, governments, and
scholars, and continues to generate controversy.").
'09 213 U.S. 347, 356-57 (1909) (internal citations omitted), overruled by Continental
Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 704-05 (1962) (observing
that anti-competitive action on foreign soil that affects U.S. commerce is subject to
U.S. antitrust law).
1o CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 25, at 737.
.' David Freestone, International Cooperation Against Terrorism and the Development of
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have, over time, chipped away at this absolute bar to extraterritorial
application of U.S. laws,112 territorial jurisdiction has always retained
its fundamental quality.1 13 Requiring a territorial nexus to the United
States reaffirmed territorial jurisdiction as one of the principle bases
of jurisdiction'14 and ensured that the FSIA would not have an unrea-
sonable extraterritorial effect.
Territorial jurisdiction also served as the basis for several of the
FSIA's exceptions to sovereign immunity since the drafters were cog-
nizant of the role the FSIA would play in the development of interna-
tional law." s As the sole means of exercising jurisdiction over a for-
eign state, it was of the utmost importance to base the FSIA upon a
solid jurisdiction basis" 6 Since territorial jurisdiction is regarded as
the most fundamental basis ofjursdiction 7 and "had a substantial ba-
sis in international practice," 8 it was capable of providing such a
framework. Most European states, for example, employ territorial ju-
risdiction in comparable statutes."9 Furthermore, multilateral con-
ventions, such as the European Convention on State Immunity, deny
immunity "if the facts which occasioned the injury or damage oc-
International Law PInciples ofJurisdiction, in TERRORISM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra
note 104, at 43.
12 See CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 25, at 738 (noting the tendency of courts and
law enforcement agencies to apply laws extraterritorially when foreign acts have a sub-
stantial effect on the United States).
"3 See Bowett, supra note 102, at 210 ("[T]he proposition that a state has the right
to regulate conduct within its territory would be regarded as axiomatic."). But see Gary
B. Born, A Reappraisal of the Extraterritorial Reach of U.S. Law, 24 LAw & POL'YINT'L Bus.
1, 1 (1992) (arguing that the "rationale for the territoriality presumption has become
obsolete and that the presumption should be abandoned").
... See REsTATEmENT, supra note 44, ch. 1, introductory note (arguing that territo-
riality remains a principal basis ofjurisdiction to prescribe).
'" See Borek Statement, supra note 49, at 14 ("Consistency of the FSIA with estab-
lished international practice is important. If we deviate from that practice and assert
jurisdiction over foreign states for acts that are generally perceived by the international
community as falling within the scope of immunity, this would tend to erode the
credibility of the FSIA.").
6 See supra Part I.C (describing the enactment of the FSIA).
"n See CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 25, at 729 ("'It is an essential attribute of the
sovereignty of this realm, as of all sovereign of independent States, that it should pos-
sess jurisdiction over all persons and things within its territorial limits and in all causes
civil and criminal arising within these limits.'") (excerpting from J. STARE,
INTRODUCTIONTO INTERNATIONAL LAW 193 (9th ed. 1984)).
' Borek Statement, supra note 49, at 13.
" See United Kingdom: State Immunity Act, 1978, ch. 33 (Eng.), reprinted in 17
I.L.M. 1123 (1978) (providing general immunity from jurisdiction but making an ex-
ception for a tort committed in the United Kingdom or a commercial transaction per-
formed there); see also Borek Statement, supra note 49, at 13 (noting that the sovereign
immunity statute of Australia also provides territorial jurisdiction).
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curred in the territory of the State of the forum, and if the author of
the injury of damage was present in that territory at the time when
those facts occurred. 
1 20
By not requiring any territorial nexus to the United States, how-
ever, the state-sponsored terrorism exception drastically unravels what
had been so carefully constructed. In enacting the terrorism excep-
tion, Congress not only deviated from traditional American jurispru-
dence and international practice,2 but it also replaced the traditional
notion of territorial jurisdiction with the most controversial and the
least justifiable jurisdictional predicate-the passive personality prin-
ciple. 12
2. The Passive Personality Principle and the 1996 Amendments
The passive personality doctrine maintains that a nation can assert
jurisdiction over "non-nationals for crimes committed against its na-
tionals outside of its territory, at least where the state has a particularly
strong interest in the crime."'2' Therefore, the only requisite factor
for establishing jurisdiction under this doctrine is the nationality of
the victim. Focusing on nationality rather than on the location of the
act demonstrates that the passive personality principle's main concern
is the "crime's effect, rather than where it occurs."24 Passive personal-
ity jurisdiction is embodied in AEDPA's state-sponsored terrorism ex-
120 Council of Europe: European Convention on State Immunity and Additional
Protocol, done May 16, 1972, 11 I.L.M. 470, 473 (1972) (reproduced from the text pro-
vided by the Council of Europe); see also Bowett, supra note 102, at 210 (acknowledging
that the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism also utilizes territorial
jurisdiction).
121 See Borek Statement, supra note 49, at 14 ("Not only does such a provision extend
well beyond the reach of our existing statute, but it also diverges significantly from the
general practice of states....").
122 See IAN BROWNLUE, PRINcIPLES OF PUBLiC INTERNATIONAL LAW 303 (4th ed.
1990) (arguing that the passive personality principle "is the leastjustifiable [of all exist-
ingjurisdictional bases], as a general principle"); see also Freestone, supra note 11, at
44-45 (observing that passive personality jurisdiction "has traditionally been regarded
by commentators as at the fringes of customary international law, and Anglo-Saxon
writers have been particularly vocal in condemning its legality"); John G. McCarthy,
Note, The Passive Personality Principle and Its Use in Combating International Terrorism, 13
FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 298, 301 (1989-1990) ("The passive personality principle is the
most controversial of the five accepted bases ofjurisdiction in international law.").
122 United States v. Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086, 1091 (D.C. Cir. 1991). It has been argued
that passive personality jurisdiction is based notjust upon a nation's interest, but also
flows from a nation's duty "to protect its nationals abroad." McCarthy, supra note 122,
at 301.
124 McCarthy, supra note 122, at 301.
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ception through 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (7) (B) (ii). This subsection for-
bids actions pursuant to the terrorism exception where neither the
"claimant nor the victim was a national of the United States... when
the act upon which the claim is based occurred.
"125
The passive personality doctrine, "always uncertain and never
really consolidated in general international practice,"126 has, since its
inception, been a source of conflict. The main point of contention is
that "subject[ing] an individual to the laws of a country with which the
individual's only connection is the victim's nationality',2 7 is an abusive
assertion ofjurisdiction. From early cases such as the Cutting Case,
to the Permanent Court of International Justice's ("PCIJ") discussion
of passive personality in The Case of the Steamship "Lotus, '1 there has
always been great resistance by the international community to judi-
cial validation of the exercise of passive personalityjurisdiction.
Although some support for the use of the passive personality doc-
trine may be found in U.S. foreign policy legislationss and case law,
'2 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (a) (7) (B) (ii) (Supp. 11 1997).
' Higgins, supra note 104, at 24.
'2 McCarthy, supra note 122, at 302.
in In the Cutting Case, a U.S. citizen published an allegedly defamatory article in a
Texas newspaper. While in Mexico he was arrested and charged with criminal libel.
The Mexican government asserted jurisdiction based upon the passive personality ju-
risdiction. The United States vigorously objected to this exercise ofjurisdiction. Un-
fortunately, the conflict ended without the issue of passive personalityjurisdiction be-
ing resolved. See The Cutting Case (Bravos district court 1886), translated in THE LAW
OF NATIONs (Herbert W. Briggs ed., 2d ed. 1952); see also BROWNLIE, supra note 122, at
303 (describing the jurisdictional controversy); McCarthy, supra note 122, at 302-03
(summarizing the facts of the case).
' (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 23. This case involved a collision
between a French steamer and a Turkish boat in international waters. The Turkish
vessel sank, killing many of the passengers and crew. As a result, the Turkish govern-
ment brought involuntary manslaughter charges against the officers on watch aboard
the French steamer. The French government asked the PCIJ to determine whether or
not the Turkish government, by bringing charges against the French citizens solely on
the basis of the victims' nationality, violated international law. Although the PCIJ was
divided (6-6), the President cast the definitive vote to hold that the Turkish govern-
ment had not violated international law. See BROWNLE, supra note 122, at 301-02 ("By
the casting vote of the President... the court decided that Turkey had not acted in
conflict with the principles of international law by exercising criminal jurisdiction.").
The significance of this case, as argued by the dissenting judges, is that the extraterri-
torial application of a nation's laws to cover actions committed by foreigners against
.nationais" violated established norms of international law. See McCarthy, supra note
122, at 304 ("All of the dissentingjudges rejected the passive personality principle be-
cause it did not conform with international law.").
" For example, the passive personality principle did serve as the basis for jurisdic-
tion in the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Anti-Terrorism Act of 1986, Pub. L. No.
99-399, 100 Stat. 855. See Smith, supra note 78, at 256 ("The Omnibus Diplomatic Se-
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the application of this doctrine has been limited to narrowly-defined
situations, and the doctrine has never served as the sole basis for juris-
diction. For example, United States v. Benite' 3 1 is frequently cited in
arguments supporting the exercise ofjurisdiction based on the passive
personality principle. In that case, Armando Benitez, a Colombian
citizen, was convicted in federal court on charges of conspiring to
murder Drug Enforcement Administration ("DEA") agents engaged
in the performance of their official duties and of assaulting and rob-
bing two DEA agents with a deadly weapon while they were perform-
ing official duties.3 Upon review, the court rejected the defendant's
argument that it improperly exercised its jurisdiction and held that
jurisdiction existed under both the protective and passive personality
principles.
3 3
Although passive personality provided thus one basis of jurisdic-
tion, it was not the sole basis. In fact, the court primarily predicated its
finding of jurisdiction upon the protective principle, and this basis
should be regarded as the more substantial of the two. Integral to the
court's reasoning was the fact that assaulting government agents while
performing their official duties has a "potentially adverse effect upon
the security or governmental functions of the nation."'3 The court,
without citing any authority, validated the use of passive personality as
a secondary basis of'jurisdiction because the victims also were nation-
als of the United States. 5 The court noted, however, that the victims
were not simply Americans citizens-they were American citizens
"who [were] also United States govemment agents."'3 Thus, the vic-
tims' occupations, rather than their nationality, served as the true ba-
sis of jurisdiction, and the use of passive personality in this case may
therefore be conceived of as simply an extension of the protective
curity and Anti-Terrorism Act of 1986 extended United States extraterritorialjurisdic-
tion to foreign nationals involved in acts which injured United States citizens." (cita-
tion omitted)). Yet, it must be recognized that this Act has been severely criticized as
being "too broad and too vague." Id. at 257 (citing Patrick L. Donnelly, Note, Extrater-
ritorial Jurisdiction overActs of Terrorism Committed Abroad: OmnibusDiplomatic Security and
Anti-Terrorism Act of 1986, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 599 (1987)). Consequently, this Act
cannot serve as an affirmative example of the acceptance of the passive personality
principle.
'3' 741 F.2d 1312 (1th Cir. 1984).
2 See id. at 1313 (describing the nature ofBenitez's convictions).
See id. at 1316 (noting that there was no doubt that jurisdiction existed under
the protective and passive personality principles).
"5 See id. ("[T] he nationality of the victims.. . clearly supports jurisdiction.").
136 d
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principle. 3 7 Thus, one cannot extrapolate from the court's use of the
passive personality doctrine as a secondary basis for jurisdiction that
the doctrine is substantially legitimized by U.S. case law'3s
Although the passive personality principle has been incorporated
into several multilateral statutes, these statutes, like the aforemen-
tioned judicial precedents, are predicated only in part upon the doc-
trine. The International Convention Against the Taking of Hos-
tages3 9 provides a solid example of the inferior status of the passive
personality principle in international law. This convention, which
condemns the act of hostage taking, requires all signatories to estab-
lish jurisdiction over any act prohibited by the convention.40 While
the state in which the act occurred must establish its jurisdiction over
such offenses,' the state seeking to assertjurisdiction pursuant to the
passive personality doctrine does not have any affirmative obligation.
Rather, in order to assert such jurisdiction, it must consider such an
exercise of jurisdiction "appropriate.",4 2 In other words, those coun-
tries that can assert territorial jurisdiction must do so. This is an af-
firmative obligation on all signatories. Yet, those countries that can
only assert jurisdiction on the basis of passive personality can only do
137 The protective principle was enacted for just this type of scenario. See supra
note 102 (discussing protectivejurisdiction and its bases).
"3 United States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 896 (D.D.C. 1988) is also cited as authorita-
tive support for the passive personality principle. Yet here too, it must be noted that
passive personality jurisdiction was not the sole basis of jurisdiction. See id. at 903
("[The Universal and Passive Personality principles, together, provide ample grounds
for this court to assert jurisdiction over [the defendant]."). Furthermore, the court
even acknowledged that upholdingjurisdiction on the basis of nationality went beyond
the norms of international law. See also United States v. Columba-Colella, 604 F.2d 356,
360 (5th Cir. 1979) (stating that the mere fact that "an act affects the citizen of a state
is not a sufficient basis for that state to assertjurisdiction over the act" and that "Con-
gress would not be competent to attach criminal sanctions to the murder of an Ameri-
can by a foreign national in a foreign country, even if the victim returned home and
succumbed to his injuries").
129 Drafting of an International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, U.N. GAOR
6th Comm., 34th Sess., Annex, Agenda Item 113, U.N. Doc. A/G.6/34/L.23 (prov. ed.
1979), reprinted in 18 I.L.M. 1456 (1979).
"o Article 5(1) provides that "[e]ach State Party shall take such measures as may be
necessary to establish its jurisdiction over any of the offenses set forth in article 1 [re-
lating to hostage taking] .... " Id. at 1458.
" See id. (discussing, in art. 5(1) (a), the mandatory assertion ofjurisdiction over
those who commit a crime mentioned in article 1 within a State Party's territory).
1 Id. David Freestone clarifies the meaning of this article by stating that it is not
up to the state wishing to seek jurisdiction under the passive personality principle to
consider such action appropriate. Rather, the article confers discretion to proceed
with passive personalityjurisdiction only to the state with primaryjurisdiction (i.e. ter-
ritorial). SeeFreestone, supra note 111, at 53 (clarifying the article's meaning).
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so if the exercise ofjurisdiction is appropriate. Consequently, the es-
tablished case law and international precedents clearly demonstrate
that prescribing jurisdiction solely on the basis of the passive personal-
ity doctrine represents a significant deviation from dominant trends in
American and international jurisprudence.
Even assuming, arguendo, that the passive personality doctrine is
an appropriate basis of prescriptive jurisdiction in this scenario, the
use of this principle is necessarily limited by an international rule of
reasonableness4 and notions of comity. T4 This concept of reason-
ableness is reflected in section 403 of the Restatement (Third) of the For-
eign Relations Law of the United States, which provides that in assessing
the reasonableness of the exercise ofjurisdiction the following factors,
among others, must enter the calculus: the link of the activity to the
regulating state; the character of the activity to be regulated; the con-
nections-such as nationality, residence, or economic activity-be-
tween the regulating state and the person principally responsible for
the activity to be regulated; the importance of the regulation to the
international political, legal or economic system; and the extent to
which another state may have an interest in regulating the activity."'
Predicating passive personality jurisdiction solely upon the vic-
tim's nationality, while ignoring all of these other factors, demon-
strates that the focus of the terrorism exception is far too myopic.
Combating international terrorism is an effort which involves a multi-
tude of players whose interests should not be sacrificed or overlooked.
Not only do foreign states in which these torts are committed have a
significant interest in bringing such perpetrators to justice, but these
states may provide a more appropriate forum for redress. When we
'4' See CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 25, at 738-40 (quoting RESTATEMENT, supra
note 44, § 403 and commenting thereupon); see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 44, §
403 cmt. a ("The principle that an otherwise valid exercise ofjurisdiction .. . is none-
theless unlawful if it is unreasonable is established in United States law, and has
emerged as a principle of international law as well.").
'4 See McCarthy, supra note 122, at 808 (acknowledging that notions of comity have
limited the application of the passive personality principle which has, in turn, led to
greater acceptance of this basis of prescriptive jurisdiction); see also CARTER & TRMBLE,
supra note 25, at 737-38 (defining comity as "'the recognition which one nation allows
within its territory to the legislative, executive, or judicial acts of another nation, hav-
ing due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own
citizens or of other persons who are under the protection of its laws'" (quoting Hilton
v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895))).
4 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 44, § 403 (2) (a)-(h) (listing these and other simi-
lar factors to be considered).
146 See Sofaer Statement, supra note 107, at 83 ("[W]here the domestic courts of the
foreign state in which a covered injury occurs provide an adequate and affecting rem-
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remove the territorial nexus requirement in the state-sponsored ter-
rorism exception, and prescribe jurisdiction solely upon the basis of
the passive personality principle, we simply fail to adequately "balance
the interests of the country whose national has been victimized against
that of the country with territoriality jurisdiction." 147
B. The Nexus Requirement and Due Process
As Professor Mary Kay Kane has noted, "whether the Republic of
France can be sued is very different from the question of where France
may be sued." 8 While the former is a question of prescriptive juris-
diction and sovereign immunity, the latter is a question of adjudicative
jurisdiction. Although "[iintemational law places very few constraints
on the exercise of adjudicatory jurisdiction,"9 its exercise is clearly
limited by notions of due process in the United States)s
From a historical perspective, American jurisprudence has always
assumed that foreign states possess due process rights."" Courts have
typically provided foreign states with such rights because when a state-
defendant acts in its non-official capacity (i.e., when the cloak of sov-
ereign immunity is removed), it stands before the court like any other
foreign non-governmental defendant5 2 Given that due process rights
are afforded to foreign corporations'53 and to foreign private per-
edy, the aggreived person.. . must pursue that remedy."). It is interesting to note that
the state-sponsored terrorism exception, while ignoring the concerns of the state in
which the activity occurs, does recognize the interests of the foreign state against
whom suit is brought and even forbids such suits unless recourse to the judicial proc-
esses of the foreign state has proven futile. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (a) (7) (B) (i) (Supp. III
1997) (stating that the foreign state must be afforded "a reasonable opportunity to ar-
bitrate the claim").
'4 McCarthy, supra note 122, at 308.
' Mary Kay Kane, Suing Foreign Sovereigns: A Procedural Compass, 34 STAN. L. REV.
385, 396 (1982).
'4 MacKusick, supra note 42, at 761.
'" See REsrATEmENT, supra note 44, § 453 cmt. c ("The exercise ofjurisdiction by
courts in the United States is subject to the due process requirements of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments.").
.. SeeVictoria A. Carter, God Save the King: Unconstitutional Assertions of PersonalJu-
risdiction over Foreign States in U.S. Courts, 82 VA. L. REV. 357, 361 (1996) ("The FSIA's
legislative history makes clear that Congress drafted this statute with [the assumption
that foreign states would enjoy due process rights] in mind.").
1 See id. at 360 ("'[W]hen a government becomes a partner in any trading com-
pany, it devests [sic] itself.., of its sovereign character, and takes that of a private citi-
zen.'" (quoting Bank of the United States v. Planters' Bank of Georgia, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 904, 907 (1824))).
1 SeeAsahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 113 (1987)
(holding that the Due Process Clause prevents a state court from exercising personal
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154
sons, logic dictates that a foreign state, stripped of its immunity,
should be entitled to the same protections. Consequently, in order to
assert a claim against a foreign sovereign nation under the FSIA, due
process dictates that the foreign state must have the requisite mini-
mum contacts as required by International Shoe Co. v. Washington.
15
Texas Trading &? Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigerial is fre-
quently cited as the "seminal case"'15 7 providing such protection. In
this breach of contract action filed pursuant to the FSIA, the Second
Circuit specifically raised the question of whether or not a foreign
state is afforded constitutional due process rights and answered this
question affirmatively15 8 Judge Kaufmann, writing for the court, held
that "each finding of personal jurisdiction under the FSIA re-
quires. . . a due process scrutiny of the court's power to exercise its
authority over a particular defendant." A due process scrutiny in-
volves a two-step inquiry: (1) whether the FSIA authorizesjurisdiction
over the foreign sovereign; and (2) whether the sovereign nation's
contacts with the United States are sufficient to support the exercise
ofjurisdiction. 4
jurisdiction over a foreign corporation except under circumstances defined in Interna-
tional Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945)).
154 United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 228 (1942) ("[A]liens as well as citizens are
entitled to the protection of the Fifth Amendment." (citing Russian Volunteer Fleet v.
United States, 282 U.S. 481, 491-92 (1931))).
155 326 U.S. 310 (1945). International Shoe requires that "in order to subject a de-
fendant to a judgment in personam, ... [the defendant must] have certain minimum
contacts with [the territory of the forum] such that the maintenance of the suit does
not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantialjustice.'" Id. at 316 (citation
omitted); see also RESTATaMNT, supra note 44, § 453 cmt. c ("Due process requires that
for a state to adjudicate claims against a defendant, the defendant must have at least a
minimum of contacts with the state."); DAVID EPSTEIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL
ITIGATION: A GUIDE TOJURISDICTION, PRACTICE, AND STRATEGY § 7.14, at 7-73 to 7-
74 (3d ed. 1998) ("The minimum contacts test of International Shoe Co. v. Washington,
and its progeny, are controlling in the determination of whether foreign sovereign de-
fendants are subject to the jurisdiction of United States courts pursuant to section
1330(b) of the FSIA."); Kane, supra note 148, at 397 ("[W]hen filing suit against a for-
eign government it is necessary to consider.., whether the assertion of personal juris-
diction would be consistent with the constitutional due process standard set out in In-
ternational Shoe v. Washington...." (footnote omitted)).
155 647 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1981).
157 See, e.g., Glannon & Atik, supra note 90, at 682 (citing Texas Trading as the
"seminal case" for reference when determining whether or not a court may exercise
personajurisdiction pursuant to the FSIA provisions and the Due Process Clause).
3 See Texas Trading 647 F.2d at 313-14 (affirming a prior judgment wherein due
process analysis was applied in a quasi in rem suit against a foreign state).
159 Id. at 308.
See id. at 312-15; see also El-Hadad v. Embassy of the U.A.E., 69 F. Supp. 2d 69, 77
(D.D.C. 1999) (acknowledging that the second step of the jurisdiction inquiry is neces-
FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMM UNITIES ACT
Although some commentators question "why a foreign sover-
eign... should be treated as a 'person' under the Due Process
Clause," 61 such a conclusion is entirely consistent with the legislative
history of the FSIA. The House Report accompanying the FSIA pro-
vides that "[fjor personal jurisdiction to exist under section 1330(b),
the claim must first of all be one.., for which the foreign state is not
entitled to immunity."6 2 Thus, the threshold issue is whether or not
one of the exemptions from immunity applies. Not only does each
exemption create subject matter jurisdiction, however, but the House
Report also notes that "each of the immunity provisions in the
bill... requires some connection between the lawsuit and the United
States or an express or implied waiver by the foreign state of its im-
munity."'63 Thus, each exemption "prescribe [s] the necessary contacts
which must exist before our courts can exercise personal jurisdic-
ton."'6 4 By requiring minimum contacts with the forum state, the
drafters of the FSIA clearly contemplated that foreign states were enti-
tled to due process protection. Based upon this conclusion, an
uncontested progeny of cases has emerged granting due process pro-
tection to foreign states.'65
sary since "Congress may not grant jurisdiction where it would violate the Constitu-
tion's Due Process Clause. The Court therefore must also determine whether exercis-
ing personal jurisdiction over the defendants is constitutionally permissible").
... Glannon & Atik, supra note 90, at 683.
16 H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 13 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6612.
'0 Id.; see also Sarah K. Schano, Note, The Scattered Remains of Sovereign Immunity for
Foreign States AflerRepublic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc.-Due Process Protection or Noth-
ing, 27 VAND. J. TRANsNAT'L L. 673, 680 (1994) ("Congress explained that because
each immunity provision in the Act requires some connection between the lawsuit in
question and the United States, the immunity provisions themselves prescribe the nec-
essary contacts that must exist before a United States court can exercise jurisdiction
over a foreign state.").
H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 13 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6612.
162 See Carter, supra note 151, at 363 ("This nexus requirement usually ensures that
assertions of personal jurisdiction under the FSIA satisfy due process requirements.");
see alsoVerlinden B.V. v. Central Bank ofNig., 461 U.S. 480, 490 (1983) (discussing the
"substantial contacts" restrictions in the FSIA that effectively limit U.S. courts' jurisdic-
tion).
"6 See, e.g., Gregorian v. Izvestia, 871 F.2d 1515, 1529 (9th Cir. 1989) (applying
Texas Trading due process analysis); Thos. P. Gonzales Corp. v. Consejo Nacional de
Produccion de Costa Rica, 614 F.2d 1247, 1250-55 (9th Cir. 1980) (applying a due pro-
cess analysis to a Costa Rican defendant); Petrol Shipping Corp. v. Kingdom of Greece,
860 F.2d 103, 107 (2d Cir. 1966) (applying service of process requirement); Victory
Transport, Inc. v. Comisaria General de Abastecimientos y Transportes, 336 F.2d 354,
364 (2d Cir. 1964) (same); Drexel Burnhan Lambert Group, Inc. v. Committee of Re-
ceivers, 810 F. Supp. 1375, 1388 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (applying constitutional due process
requirements to personal jurisdiction analysis under FSIA), rev'd on other grounds, 12
F.3d 317 (2d Cir. 1993); Walpex Trading Co. v. Yacimientos Petroliferos Fiscales Boll-
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Despite this line of authority, Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc.
167
reopened the question of whether or not a foreign state is a person
within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. Justice Scalia, writing
for the court, "[a]ssum[ed], without deciding, that a foreign state is a
'person' for purposes of the Due Process Clause." ' 6 Yet, Scalia's cita-
tion of South Carolina v. Katzenbacha69 with the parenthetical that
"States of the Union are not 'persons' for purposes of the Due Process
Clause,"' suggests that if the question of whether or not a foreign
state is a person within the meaning of the Due Process Clause were
specifically presented to the Supreme Court, the holding in Katzenbach
171would compel the Court to conclude that the answer is no.
Even if, as some commentators have argued, the Constitution does
not require courts to provide due process protection to foreign states
as defendants,ln the inquiry does not end here. The legislative history
of the FSIA clearly reveals that it was the specific intent of the drafters
to provide such protection by prescribing the minimum contacts nec-
essary for each exception.ln The state-sponsored terrorism exception,
by removing the territorial nexus and replacing it with the passive per-
sonality doctrine's nationality requirement, drastically undermines the
due process concerns Congress specifically preserved in enacting the
FSIA.
vanos, 712 F. Supp. 383, 390 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (granting due process protection under
FSIA pursuant to Texas Trading); Chicago Bridge & Iron Co. v. Islamic Republic of
Iran, 506 F. Supp. 981, 988 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (applying the International Shoe personal
jurisdiction analysis).
167 504 U.S. 607 (1992).
16 1& at 619.
86 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
170 Weltover, 504 U.S. at 619 (citing Katxenback, 383 U.S. at 323-24).
171 See Glannon & Atik, supra note 90, at 680 (concluding that the Court may be
inviting reconsideration of the status of foreign states by virtue of its reference to
Katzenbadi). But see Schano, supra note 163, at 713-17 (concluding that, despite Welto-
ver, compliance with principles of international law and practical considerations com-
pel American courts to provide due process protection to foreign states with respect to
a determination ofjurisdiction). Other commentators also have argued that Kaizen-
badi does not necessarily compel the conclusion that foreign states are not persons for
purposes of the Due Process Clause because of the disparate circumstances. While
South Carolina invoked the Due Process Clause in Katzenbach as a plaintiff seeking to
invalidate an act of Congress, foreign states, as defendants, invoke the clause merely
"to defend against personal jurisdiction... as unwilling defendants." Carter, supra
note 151, at 362. Furthermore, South Carolina did not invoke the Due Process Clause
"to avoid litigating matters with little or no connection with the United States." Id.
172 See Glannon & Atik, supra note 90, at 688-92 (arguing that history, original in-
tent, and application of International Shoe inevitably lead to the conclusion that the Due
Process Clause protects persons, not states).
'73 See supra notes 156-65 and accompanying text.
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As Professor Kane noted, the goal of the FSIA was to "promote a
uniform body of law so that foreign state defendants, as well as private
plaintiffs, can predict their exposure to suit and act accordingly."174
The mere nationality of the victim, which might not even be known to
the offending nation, however, cannot possibly provide the minimum
contacts necessary to sustain personal jurisdiction. Furthermore, one
may assert the passive personality principle even where the target's na-
tionality does not serve as the basis of the attack.175 Therefore, subject-
ing foreign nations to suit in the United States for acts of terrorism
that do not target American citizens cannot possibly comply with in-
ternational notions of fairness and comity.
The effect of removing the territorial nexus and replacing it with
passive personality jurisdiction on the provision of due process rights
should, as Professors Glannon and Atik noted, "have given pause to
the drafters of the 1996 amendments to the FSIA.", 76 Yet, due process
concerns were not even mentioned in the legislative history of the
amendments.177 Clearly, Congress did not dedicate the same attention
to this issue while enacting the 1996 amendments as it did when en-
acting the FSIA. By failing to "keep in mind the fundamental interests
that [the FSIA] is designed to advance and the careful balances re-
flected in that law,"'78 these recent amendments represent a drastic
departure from traditional sovereign immunityjurisprudence.
C. Designating State Sponsors of Terrorism and Political Concerns
One of the most important goals of the FSIA was to remove the
unpredictable political element from the decision regarding exemp-
tions of sovereign immunity.'7 Prior to the enactment of the FSIA,
the executive branch, acting only upon the initiative of a foreign na-
174 Kane, supra note 148, at 403.
' See United States v. Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086, 1091 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (determining
that a terrorist need not target nationals of the state asserting jurisdiction in order to
subject himself to passive personalityjurisdiction).
176 Glannon & Atik, supra note 90, at 685. These commentators also suggested that
by ignoring the precedential authority of cases applying due process concerns to for-
eign states, these recent amendments are "on a collision course" with establishedjudi-
cial authority. Id. at 679.
'7' See id. at 685 ("A diligent search of the background documents revealed virtually
no reference to any constitutional due process problem in extending federal jurisdic-
tion to such cases.").
178 Borek Statement, supra note 49, at 12-13.
"9 See supra Part I.B (demonstrating that decisions regarding sovereign immunity
prior to the enactment of the FSIA were politically motivated and unreliable).
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tion, decided whether or not to waive sovereign immunity. This dele-
gation of power, however, resulted in politically motivated, inconsis-
tent results.180 As a result, Congress decided that allowing the judici-
ary, which would act on a nonpartisan basis, to make such
determinations would greatly enhance the predictability and uniform-
ity of U.S. sovereign immunityjurisprudence.
8 1
The state-sponsored terrorism exception, however, by its applica-
don to only those nations designated as state sponsors of terrorism,us
re-injects the unpredictable political element that the drafters of the
FSIA desperately tried to remove. By designating or rescinding a de-
termination of sponsorship of terrorism, the State Department "is able
to control which states are granted immunity and which are not."'83
Consequently, this exception "appears to be grounded not in princi-
ple, but in political accommodation. "184 By limiting the state-
sponsored terrorism exception to only designated states, the excep-
tion "differentiates the rights of victims based on who committed the
wrong, rather than determining a victim's rights with reference to the
"0 See supra Part I.C (summarizing Monroe Leigh's argument in favor of enacting
the FSIA, which would align the U.S. system with international norms and promote
clear guidance for U.S. plaintiffs).
181 SeeMiguel Angel Gonzalez Felix, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: Fair Play for
Foreign States and the Need for Some Procedural Improvements, 8 HoUs. J. INT'L L. 1, 10
(1985) ("Congress sought to depoliticize the issue of sovereign immunity by placing
the responsibility for its resolution exclusively in the hands of the judiciary."); Roht-
Arriaza, supra note 86, at 72-73 ("[Olne of the FSIA's principal objectives was to trans-
fer the determination of sovereign immunity from the State Department to the
courts ... , remov[ing] the unpredictability and uncertainty inherent in the existing
system, and remov[ing] the diplomatic pressures on the executive branch to influence
the process."); MacKusick, supra note 42, at 769 ("One of the main purposes of enact-
ing the FSIA was to transfer the decision making process regarding immunity determi-
nations from the executive branch to the judicial branch.., to remove the process
from political pressures and to allow the judiciary to make the determination based
upon well defined criteria.").
182 See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7)(A) (1994 & Supp. H 1996) (acknowledging that ju-
risdiction under the FSIA will be denied unless the nation that sponsored the attack
has been designated as a sponsor of terrorism pursuant to section 6(j) of the Export
Administration Act of 1979 or section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961).
The Secretary of State makes such determinations and publishes the list in the Federal
Register. As of this writing, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria have all been
designated as state sponsors of terrorism. See 59 Fed. Reg. 51,130, 51,131 (1994) (to be
codified at 48 C.F.R. pt. 209) (listing those nations that the Secretary of State has iden-
tified as "terrorist countries" pursuant to section 60) of the Export Administration Act
of 1979).
183 MacKusick, supra note 42, at 770.
184 Bucci, supra note 43, at 317.
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nature of the wrong."'8 5 Inevitably, focusing on the actor rather than
on the action when determining which nations are subject to liability
will result in a decision to punish only those states that have been
stigmatized as "terrorist nations" by the State Department... Fur-
thermore, AEDPA also permits the Attorney General to stay any dis-
covery upon certifying that such investigation "would significantly in-
terfere with a criminal investigation or prosecution, or a national
security operation, related to the incident that gave rise to the case of
action." 87 In making such determinations, political factors will inevi-
tably enter the calculus. While there is no argument that Congress
has the power to place such determinations within the purview of the
Secretary of State 8 and to empower the Attorney General to stay dis-
covery, it is important to note that by implementing these regulations,
Congress drastically deviates from the steady apolitical course the
FSIA has forged.
D. Attachment and Substantive Causes of Action
Part II, thus far, has focused on how AEDPA's state-sponsored ter-
rorism exception represents a profound deviation from the estab-
lished doctrine of sovereign immunity. This Act, however, includes
other sections, which also deviate from this steady course. Specifically,
the new attachment provisions. represent a significant departure
185 Id. at 317-18.
19 See StephenJ. Schnably, International Decisions, Alejandre v. Republic of Cuba,
92 AM. J. INT'L L. 768, 771 (1998) (summary of case) (opining that one should not
"expect strategic foreign policy considerations to play no role in the handling of hu-
man rights matters by the political branches. It would be unfortunate, however, if the
judiiary's role in redressing human rights violations abroad were subordinated to the
aim of punishing states on an enemies list").
187 28 U.S.C. § 1605(g) (1) (A) (Supp. III 1997). See generally Joseph M. Terry,
Comment,JurisdictionalDiscovery Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 66 U. Ci. L.
REV. 1029, 1043-59 (1999) (detailing the problems with the discovery provisions of the
1996 amendments and arguing for an alternative approach).
18 See Rein v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 995 F. Supp. 325, 330
(E.D.N.Y. 1998) ("The Secretary's designation [is] ... accorded to a foreign state by
Congress and the Executive in their exclusive and discretionary exercise of their for-
eign affairs powers under the Constitution.").
28 U.S.C. § 1610(a) (7) (Supp. III 1997) provides:
(a) The property in the United States of a foreign state.., used for a com-
mercial activity in the United States, shall not be immune from attachment in
aid of execution ... if-
"7) the judgment relates to a claim for which the foreign state is not im-
mune under section 1605 (a) (7), regardless of whether the property is or was
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from traditional practice.
While the practical implications of the amended attachment pro-
vision will be explored below,9" it is important to note that permitting
the attachment of a foreign state's property, without any nexus to the
incidents which serve as the basis of the withdrawal of immunity, is a
substantial break with precedent. 9' All other prejudgment attach-
ments have required a connection to the activity or an explicit waiver
of immunity from such attachment. 92 Congress enacted these re-
quirements as a result of the fear that American property abroad
could be exposed to reciprocal treatment. 93 While the State Depart-
ment admonished expanding the scope of prejudgment attachment
to include attaching all state property regardless of connection,
AEDPA's attachment provision creates such a result.
Finally, the Flatow Amendment itself represents an unreasonable
deviation from the evolution of sovereign immunity. Although the
FSIA, as amended by AEDPA, withdraws the cloak of immunity, the
Flatow Amendment creates a substantive cause of action enabling re-
covery for personal injury or death committed by any "'official, em-
ployee, or agent of a foreign state designated as a state sponsor of ter-
rorism... while acting within the scope of his or her office,
employment, or agency.'"'" This additional cause of action is signifi-
cant "because the FSIA as otherwise enacted is not intended to affect
the substantive law of liability in actions against foreign states. "11 By
involved with the act upon which the claim is based.
id
190 See infra Part III (discussing the practical consequences of civil suits under the
amendments).
1 See Murphy, supra note 75, at 456 ("Normally, the property of a foreign state is
immune from attachment or execution if the property was not involved with the act
upon which the claim is based."); see also Borek Statemen4 supra note 49, at 14 ("Execu-
tion against the property of a foreign state. . is narrowly circumscribed by section
1610, which permits execution against the property of a foreign state only if the prop-
erty is used for a commercial activity in the United States, and then only in specifically
defined circumstances.").
192 See Borek Statenent, supra note 49, at 13 (noting that the amendment would
eliminate any nexus requirement and would allow prejudgment attachment without
waiver by the foreign state).
193 See id. at 15 (noting that the exposure of U.S. government property abroad dic-
tates curtailing prejudgment attachment).
194 See id. (opposing "proposals that would permit prejudgment attachment with-
out a waiver").
195 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (1994 & Supp. III 1997) (quoting Pub. L. No. 104-208).
196 John F. Murphy, Civil Liability for the Commission of International Crimes As an Al-
ternative to Criminal Prosecution, 12 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 1, 39 (1999); see also Flatow v.
Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1, 13 (D.D.C.. 1998) ("[T]he state sponsored ter-
FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT
providing an additional remedy, the amendment clearly violates the
purpose of the FSIA. 97
III. JUDGMENTS RENDERED, CLOSURE DENIED: THE PRACTICAL
CONSEQUENCES OF CIVIL SUITS UNDER
THE 1996 AMENDMENTS
The consequences of the recent amendments are not limited to
mere theoretical concerns. The recent suits filed pursuant to these
amendments have demonstrated, in practice, that private suits have
neither resulted in a decrease in state-sponsored terrorism nor pro-
vided the accountability and closure that victims' families seek
through recourse to the private suit.98 The only result of such private
suits has been an increase in the number of suits brought.19 Coupling
these practical consequences with the theoretical concerns, however,
ultimately leads one to conclude that the experiment of the private
suit has failed and recourse to such suits must be reexamined.
Before analyzing the practical consequences of such suits, a brief
background of these cases is necessary. The first suit filed pursuant to
the recent amendments to the FSIA was Alejandre v. Republic of Cuba.°0
The facts which gave rise to the civil suit in Alejandre are the same facts
which persuaded Congress to enact the Helms-Burton Act.21' On Feb-
rorism exception... is a remedial statute. It creates no new responsibilities or obliga-
tions; it only creates a forum for the enforcement of pre-existing universally recog-
nized rights under federal common law and international law.").
197 See Liu v. Republic of China, 892 F.2d 1419, 1425 (9th Cir. 1989) ("The FSIA
does not create a federal rule of liability to be applied in an action involving a foreign
state."); H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 12 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.4.N. 6604, 6610
(stating "[t]his bill is not intended to affect the substantive law of liability").
193 See Gerson, supra note 12 ("It gives the victims of terrorism and their families
what they desire more-accountability, the opportunity to get the true facts out in the
open and thus to obtain closure to their own personal trials while at the same time
preventing state-sponsors of terrorism from evading responsibility.").
See, e.g., Dirk Johnson, Journalist Held Hostage in Lebanon Sues Iran, N.Y. TMEs,
Mar. 23, 1999, at A14 (stating that ex-hostage Thomas Sutherland plans on filing a suit
against Iran for its role in his imprisonment in Lebanon); Bill Miller, Ex-Hostage Ander-
son Fles Suit Against Iran, WASH. POST, Mar. 23, 1999, at A5 (reporting that Terry An-
derson filed a $100 million lawsuit against Iran for sponsoring the terrorist organiza-
tion that held him captive for seven years); Parents of Bomb Victims Sue Iran in U.S. Court,
REcORD, N. NJ., Feb. 10, 1999, at All, available in 1999 WL 7089054 (describing a suit
brought against Hamas, an Islamic militant group, which claimed responsibility for a
terrorist attack killing two American students, Sara Duker and MatthewEisenfeld).
200 996 F. Supp. 1239 (S.D. Fla. 1997). There is a subtle irony in the fact that the
first suit filed under the Flatow Amendmentwas not the Thatow case itself.
201 See Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-114, 110 Stat. 785, 804-05 (codified at 22 U.S.C.A. §§ 6021-6091) (stating, in
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ruary 24, 1996, the Cuban Air Force, upon orders of the government
of Cuba, and "in outrageous contempt for international law and basic
human rights," shot down two unarmed civilian planes over interna-
tional waters as they searched for rafters in the waters between Cuba
202and Florida. As a result of this unprovoked attack, four individuals
were killed.
Three of the victims' families20 ' brought suit against the Republic
of Cuba and the Cuban Air Force pursuant to the recent amendments
to the FSIA. Neither the Cuban government, nor the Cuban Air
Force, entered an appearance.0 4 Since federal law prohibits the en-
tering of a default judgment against a foreign government, the court
acknowledged Cuba's default, and held a hearing to determine
201whether the plaintiff's allegations were supported by the evidence.
In order to remove the presumption of foreign sovereign immu-
nity, the plaintiffs invoked § 1605(a) (7) of the FSIA.2 °0 Having done
§ 6046, congressional findings of fact relating to the shooting down of Brothers to the
Rescue aircraft); Aljandre, 996 F. Supp. at 1247 (noting that the Cuban government's
actions precipitated the enactment of the LIBERTAD Act); Schnably, supra note 186,
at 768 (the incident "prompted Congress to enact the controversial Helms-Burton
Act"). This incident also provoked the animosity of the international community. See
Alejandre, 996 F. Supp. at 1246-47 (acknowledging the international condemnation of
the unprovoked attack).
202 The civilian planes were part of a Miami-based humanitarian organization
called "Brothers to the Rescue" [Hermanos alRescatel. The purpose of this organization
is "to search the Florida Straits for rafters, Cuban refugees who had fled the island na-
tion on precarious inner tubes or makeshift rafts .... Brothers to the Rescue would
locate the rafters and provide them with life-saving assistance by informing the U.S.
Coast Guard of their location and condition." Id. at 1243.
202 Since one of the requirements of the state-sponsored terrorism exception is that
the victims must be nationals of the United States, one of the victims, not an American
citizen, could not join as a party to the suit. See id. at 1242; see also 28 U.S.C.
§ 1605(a) (7) (B) (ii) (Supp. 1111997) (denying the waiver of immunitywhen the victims
or claimants under this exception are not nationals of the United States).
2" Although Cuba did not enter an appearance, the court did note that Cuba ob-
jected, in a diplomatic note, to the court's exercise ofjurisdiction over it and its politi-
cal subdivision. See Alejandre 996 F. Supp. at 1242 (describing Cuba's objection to
suit).
2o' See 28 U.S.C. § 1608(e) (1994) (providing that upon default by a foreign gov-
ernment, claimants must establish their "claim or right to relief by evidence satisfactory
to the court"); see also Alejandre, 996 F. Supp. at 1242 n.1 ("Congressional purpose be-
hind this section was to protect foreign states from 'unfounded default judgments
rendered solely upon a procedural default.'" (quoting Compania Interamericana Ex-
port-Import S.A. v. Compania Dominicana de Aviacion, 88 F.3d 948, 950-51 (11th Cir.
1996))).
206 The court concluded that the plaintiffs fulfilled all the requirements of
§ 1605(a) (7): first, the United States has designated Cuba as a state-sponsor of terror-
ism; second, the Cuban Air Force was acting as an agent of the Cuban government;
third, the act occurred outside the foreign state; and fourth, the claimants and victims
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so, the plaintiffs then predicated liability against the Cuban Air Force
and the Republic of Cuba, through respondeat superior liability, pur-
suant to the FlatowAmendment.20 7 The court excerpted at length the
radio communications between the Cuban Air Force and the military
controls in Havana to demonstrate that the attack on the civilian
plane was pursuant to Cuba's orders.0  Persuaded by this evidence,
the court concluded that "both the Cuban Air Force and Cuba are li-
able for the murders of Alejandre, Costa, and De la Pena" and conse-
209quently entered judgment for the plaintiffs.
Having concluded that the Cuban government and air force were
liable, the trial progressed to the damages phase. Guided by the Fla-
tow Amendment,21° the court noted the Cuban Air Force would be li-
211able for both compensatory and punitive damages. Since the FSIA
explicitly prohibits the imposition of punitive damages against a for-
eign state itself,212 the court held that Cuba, by virtue of respondeat
superior liability, would be liable only for compensatory damages. 3
The final damage judgment awarded $187,627,911 ($49,927,911 in
compensatory damages assessed against both Cuba and its air force
and $137,700,000 in punitive damages assessed against the Cuban Air
Force alone) 24
The second decision rendered pursuant to the recent amend-
2151ments, Ratow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, contains, perhaps, the most
were U.S. nationals at the time the acts occurred. SeeAlejandre, 996 F. Supp. at 1247-48
(listing the requirements of § 1605(a) (7) and examining the facts of the case in light
of each requirement).
See id. at 1249 (observing that the statute essentially makes states liable for its
agents or employees).
2 See id. at 1244-46 (excerpting radio communications from Cuban military con-
trol giving authorization to destroy the aircraft).
2 Id. at 1249.
210 See 28 U.S.C. § 1605 note (Supp. III 1997) (providing "money damages which
may include economic damages, solatium, pain, and suffering, and punitive damages"
for actions brought pursuant to any action covered by the state-sponsored terrorism
exception, § 1605 (a) (7)).
211 See Alejandre, 996 F. Supp. at 1249 ("Under the theory of respondeat superior,
Cuba is liable for the same amount of damages as its agent, with the exception of puni-
tive damages, which the FSIA prohibits against foreign states.").
212 See 28 U.S.C. § 1606 (1994) ("[Tlhe foreign state shall be liable in the same
manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances; but a
foreign state except for an agency or instrumentality thereof shall not be liable for pu-
nitive damages.").
213 See Alejandre, 996 F. Supp. at 1253 (holding Cuba liable for compensatory dam-
ages and the Cuban Air Force liable for compensatory and punitive damages).
2,4 See id. (detailing breakdown of total award amount).
21 999 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1998).
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thorough treatment of the complex issues of liability and damages. 6
Alisa Flatow, a junior at Brandeis University, was studying in Israel
when she was killed by a suicide-bomber attack on a tour bus en route
217to Gush Katif as the bus traveled through the Gaza Strip. The next
day, the Shaqaqi faction of the Palestine IslamicJihad claimed respon-
sibility for the attack. 8 By contacting the State Department and con-
ducting their own investigation, the Flatows were able to trace money
from the Iranian government directly to this terrorist organization.2 19
Fueled by their desire to hold Iran accountable for this attack and
armed with the Flatow Amendment, Alisa's family filed suit against
Iran.
As with the Cuban government in Alejandre, the Iranian govern-
ment did not enter an appearance.22 The position of the Iranian gov-
ernment, despite its failure to enter an appearance or to issue any dip-
lomatic notice, was clear: the United States lacked jurisdiction to hear
this case.22' The court, as it did in Alejandre, examined the plaintiffs'
evidence and entered several conclusions of fact and law. The court
ultimately found that Iran was responsible for the killing of Alisa Fla-
tow by a member of the Shaqaqi faction of the Palestine Islamic Jihad
"under the direction of Iran. "24 In awarding damages, the court did
not feel as constrained as the Alejandre court did and assessed both
compensatory and punitive damages against Iran.2 Under the doc-
216 For a detailed case analysis of Flatow, see EthanJ. Early, Note, Flatow v. Islamic
Republic of Iran and the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: Is Peace of Mind Enough?, 14
CONN.J. INT'LL. 203 (1999) (examininglatowin relation to the FSIA).
217 SeeFlatow, 999 F. Supp. at 6-10 (detailing the court's finding of facts).
2'a As the court noted, the "Shaqaqi faction is a terrorist cell [of the Palestine Is-
lamicJihad] with a small core membership. Its sole purpose is to conduct terrorist ac-
tivities in the Gaza region, and its sole source of funding is the Islamic Republic of
Iran." Id. at 8.
219 See 60 Minutes, supra note 1 (noting that copies of the Iranian Budget for 1995
blatantly detailed an expenditure of "$20 million to support [the] Palestine Islamic
revolution").
'0 See flatow, 999 F. Supp. at 6 (noting that "[d]efendants have not entered an ap-
pearance in this matter").
2' In fact, the Iranian government, "an experienced litigant in the United States
federal court system," effectively tried to evade service of process by writing "DO NOT
USA" on the back of the service package and returned the package to the United
States. Id. at 6 n.1; see also Bill Miller & John Mintz, Once-Supportive U.S. Fights Family
over Iranian Assets, WASH. POST, Sept. 27, 1998, at A8 (quoting Mahmoud Mohammadi,
an employee of Iran's Foreign Ministry, as questioning, "How can one judge of a coun-
try issue a verdict against a sovereign foreign government?").
222Flatow, 999 F. Supp. at 10.
22 See infra notes 258-64 and accompanying notes (discussing this award of punitive
damages).
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trine of respondeat superior and vicarious liability, the court awarded
the plaintiffs $225 million in punitive damages. 4 Adding this puni-
tive damage award to the compensatory damages, the damages
awarded for the pain and suffering endured by Alisa, and solarium
damages brought the total damage award to $247.5 million.2
On of the most recent judgments rendered pursuant to the state-
sponsored terrorism exception is Cidppio v. Islamic Republic of Iran
56
Joseph Cicippio,27 Frank Reedm and David Jacobsen229 were three of
the eighteen American hostages held captive in Lebanon by Hizbal-
lah, "a politico-paramilitary organization sponsored, financed, and
controlled by Iran."m These three men, on behalf of themselves and
on behalf of two of their spouses,23' filed suit pursuant to the recent
amendments to the FSIA.
As in the Ratow case, Iran failed to enter an appearance, and a
hearing proceeded ex parte.02 Based on the evidence provided by the
224
In this Court's judgment, in order to ensure that the Islamic Republic of Iran
will refrain from sponsoring such terrorist acts in the future, an award of pu-
nitive damages in the amount of three times the Islamic Republic of Iran's
annual expenditure for terrorist activities [of $75 million] is appropriate.
FRatow, 999 F. Supp. at 34.
See id. at 5 (detailing the damages of the award).
18 F. Supp. 2d 62 (D.D.C. 1998).
Joseph Cicippio, Comptroller of the American University of Beirut, was kid-
napped on September 12, 1986 and imprisoned for 1908 days. See id. at 64, 66. While
imprisoned, Cicippio was subjected to "terrifying interrogation," threats of castration,
Russian roulette, and random beatings. Id. at 66. He was confined in "rodent- and
scorpion-infested cells, and for virtually his entire time in captivity he was bound by
chains." Id. As a result of his imprisonment, Cicippio lost 60 pounds and developed
serious physical problems which still affect him today. See id.
22 Frank Reed, co-owner and operator of two private schools in Beirut, was ab-
ducted on September 9, 1986 and "kept in solitary confinement for two years blind-
folded and chained to the wall or floor." Id. at 64-65. Apart from daily torture and
death threats, electric shocks were administered to Reed's hands and, after one of his
attempts to escape, he was forced to kneel on spikes. See id. at 65.
David Jacobsen, Chief Executive Officer of the American University of Beirut
Medical Center, was abducted on May 28, 1985 and held captive for 18 months. See id.
at 64. Clothed in only underwear and a T-shirtJacobsen was subjected to regular beat-
ings and mental torture. See id. at 65.
Id. at 64 ("Hizballah's mission was to exploit the disorder in Lebanon following
the Israeli military incursion of 1982 and to diminish American influence in the re-
gion."); see also Miller & Mintz, supra note 221 (describing the kidnapping and tortur-
ing of these three hostages).
231 Elham Cicippio and Fifi Dalati-Reed were both named plaintiffs and testified at
trial to the mental anguish they suffered while their husbands were imprisoned. See
Cidppio, 18 F. Supp. 2d at 66-67 (summarizing their testimony).
212 See id. at 64 (noting that service was effected on April 28, 1997, but that Iran did
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plaintiffs, the court concluded that all the requirements of the state-
sponsored terrorism exception were met: (1) the plaintiffs were in-
jured by acts of torture; (2) the acts were committed by a state-
supported terrorist group; (3) material support was provided by Ira-
nian officials engaged within the scope of their employment; (4) Iran
was, at the time, designated as a state sponsor of terrorism; (5) the
claimants and victims were nationals of the United States; and (6)
similar acts by U.S. officials, if performed within the scope of their
employment, would give rise to a cause of action.ss The court
awarded compensatory damages in the following amounts: Joseph
Cicippio ($20 million); Elham Cicippio ($10 million); Frank Reed
($16 million); Fifi Delati-Reed ($10 million); and David Jacobsen ($9
million).2
Having briefly summarized the decided cases, it is possible to de-
duce some common practical consequences of these decisions. These
consequences clearly demonstrate the inability of private civil suits, on
a practical level, to effectuate the stated purpose of the amendments
and to provide the accountability and closure that impelled the liti-
gants to file suit in the first place.
A. Pre-Trial Consequences
By limiting the class of potential defendants only to those desig-
nated as state sponsors of terrorism, the new amendments to the FSIA
have drastic practical consequences even at the pre-trial level. Unless
a state that commits the terrorist act has been designated by the State
Department as a state sponsor of terrorism, the victims of such attacks
have no recourse under the terrorism exception to the FSIA.O Yet,
unlike litigants in most of the other enumerated exceptions to the
FSIA who purposefully chose to engage in the activity with the foreign
nation that gave rise to the suit, victims of state-sponsored terrorism
have not made such a choice. Limiting the recourse of these litigants
not enter an appearance).
See id. at 68 (summarizing the plaintiffs' evidence).
2m Unlike the court in Fatow, however, the court followed the Alejandre court's ex-
ample and refrained from issuing punitive damages. See id. at 69 ("[T]he Court must
undertake the difficult task of calculating an award of compensatory damages to make
plaintiffs whole, while nevertheless avoiding any punitive component that would surely
accompany a compensatory award were the defendant at bar not possessed of statutory
immunity.").
2's See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (7) (A) (Supp. IH 1997) (providing that foreign states
shall not be immune to U.S. jurisdiction if they are "designated as a state sponsor of
terrorism").
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to a political determination of the State Department over which these
individuals have no control is profoundly unfair.
While this limitation was not an obstacle to the plaintiffs in Aldan-
dre, Flatow, and Cicippio, the case of Scott Nelson provides a clear ex-
ample of the inequity of this situation.2 6 Scott Nelson, an American
citizen, worked as a monitoring systems engineer at King Faisal Spe-
cialist Hospital in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.27 Although his employment
progressed largely without incident, in March of 1984, Nelson first ad-
vised hospital officials about "safety defects in the hospital's oxygen
and nitrous oxide lines."2s A few months later, Nelson was summoned
"to the hospital security office where agents of the Saudi government
arrested him.." 2s Upon his arrest, Nelson was shackled, tortured,
beaten, and kept for four days without food.240
Nelson, finally released after a thirty-nine day detention, filed suit
against Saudi Arabia. Since he commenced this suit prior to the en-
actment of § 1605(a) (7), Nelson was forced to pursue recourse within
§ 1605(a) (2)-the commercial activity exception. The district court
dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction since Nelson failed to al-
lege a sufficient nexus between his recruitment in the United States
and the injuries sustained to permit a finding of "commercial activ-
ity."2" Although the Court of Appeals reversed,2 42 the Supreme Court
agreed with the district court and barred Nelson's suit.!
While the state-sponsored terrorism exception was designed to
remedy this exact situation,244 Nelson still has no recourse. Since
Saudi Arabia has not been designated as a sponsor of terrorism, it is
not amenable to suit and retains its sovereign immunity.2 Placing
n' See Bucci, supra note 43, at 316-19 (detailing the circumstances surrounding the
Nelson case).
2'7 See Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 352 (1993) (describing the circum-
stances of Nelson's employment in Saudi Arabia).
Z3 a
239 Id.
2'0 See id. at 353.
241 Id. at 354. Nelson argued that Saudi Arabia had acted in a "commercial man-
ner" by recruiting employees in the United States, and that the commercial activity ex-
ception therefore applied. Id.
242 See923 F.2d 1528 (1lth Cir. 1991), rev'd 507 U.S. 349 (1993).
24- See Nelson, 507 U.S. at 363 (reversing the Court of Appeals).
244 See supra Part I.A.2 (discussing development of the passive personality principle
to escape the nexus requirement).
242 See Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement: Terrorist Countries,
supra note 83 (identifying terrorist countries as Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea,
Sudan, and Syria).
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emphasis on the actor, rather than on the action itself, subjects the
victims of terrorism to the uncertain political climate of foreign rela-
tions-a situation over which they have no control. As Daniel Wolf,
counsel for Scott Nelson, stated, "[tihere is no... principled reason
for providing redress in our courts for American citizens who are tor-
tured by officials of foreign states on the Department's list, but deny-
ing such redress to Americans who are tortured by officials of other
countries. ', 46 Denying relief for terrorist acts committed by nations
not designated as state sponsors of terrorists leads one inevitably to
question the true focus of U.S. counter-terrorism policy.
B. Trial Consequences
Beyond such pre-trial considerations, civil suits pursuant to the re-
cent amendments also demonstrate serious practical consequences at
the trial phase which courts cannot ignore. First of all, despite initial
commentary predicting that foreign nations would appear in actions
brought against them,247 all three decided cases have proceeded ex
parte 48 Proceeding with a trial without the participation of the for-
246 VIctims of Torture: Heafings Before Subcomm. on Int'l Operations and Human Rights of
the House Comm. on Int'l Relations, 104th Cong. 88 (1996) (statement of Daniel Wolf).
247 See Sofaer Statement, supra note 107, at 84 ("The concern that this legislation will
result in unenforceable default judgments is equally unpersuasive.... In most in-
stances ... a foreign state will appear and assert its rights, rather than exposing its
property to attachment.").
24, See Cicippio v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 18 F. Supp. 2d 62, 64 (D.D.C. 1998)
(noting that Iran was served with process but did not respond to the complaint or en-
ter an appearance); Flatow v. Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1, 6 n.1 (D.D.C. 1998)
(noting that Iran gave no response to service of process and made no appearance);
Alejandre v. Republic of Cuba, 996 F. Supp. 1239, 1242 (S.D. Fla. 1997) (noting that
Cuba objected to jurisdiction in a diplomatic note but failed to respond or enter an
appearance).
It is important to note that another case filed pursuant to the terrorism exception
to the FSIA has not resulted in a defaultjudgment thus far. Although this case has yet
to come to trial, Rein v. Socialist People's Libyan ArabJamahifya might be the first case
under the recent amendments not to result in a default judgment. This case is the
next chapter in the Smith saga. See supra notes 65-74 and accompanying text (examin-
ing the inability of the plaintiffs in Smith v. Socialist People's Libyan ArabJamahiriya,
886 F. Supp. 306 (E.D.N.Y. 1995), to assert any claims against Libya under the FSIA, as
originally enacted). After Smith was dismissed for lack ofjurisdiction, the plaintiffs in
that case filed suit against Libya under the new terrorism exception. Libya, unlike Iran
and Cuba, contested the exercise ofjurisdiction and filed a motion to dismiss. This
motion was denied by both the district court, 995 F. Supp. 325 (E.D.N.Y. 1998), and
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 162 F.3d 748 (2d Cir. 1998). On June 14,
1999, the Supreme Court declined to issue a writ of certiorari. See Socialist People's
Libyan ArabJamahiriya v. Rein, 119 S. Ct. 2337 (1999). It remains to be seen whether
or not Libya will actually proceed to trial.
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eign nation has serious consequences on a number of levels.
From an international perspective, allowing cases to proceed ex
parte erodes the credibility of the FSIA. Although "defaults are not
favored by the FSIA, they are available pursuant to section 1608(e)." 249
After the court enters a default, it must still determine whether the
plaintiff's allegations are supported by evidence.m Yet, in making that
determination, the court need not hold a hearing or make any ex-
plicit findings, as long as the record shows that the plaintiff provided
enough evidence to support his claim.5 In fact, the burden of proof
overall is "less than if defendants had participated in discovery."2
52
Proceeding to enter findings of fact and law without the participation
of the foreign state clearly "create [s] the impression that the primary
motive behind such action is not a concern for human rights but the
pursuit of partisan political ends."B3
Furthermore, in amending the FSIA, the State Department ad-
monished that "[n] ot only do we [the United States] look to the FSIA
as a guide in asserting our own immunity abroad, but foreign states
themselves may well apply [the FSIA's] standards against us, as a mat-
ter of reciprocity. "2M Thus, there is the inherent risk that foreign na-
tions will enact legislation denying sovereign immunity for acts for
which the United States considers itself immune. 5 Consequently,
when such actions are brought against the United States in foreign
courts, and the United States, based upon jurisdictional objections,
29 EPSTEIN ETAL., supra note 155, § 7.16.
m See 28 U.S.C. § 1608(e) (1994) ("No judgment by default shall be en-
tered... unless the claimant establishes his claim or right to relief by evidence satisfac-
tory to the court.").
251 See EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 155, § 7.16 (quoting Commercial Bank of Kuwait
v. Rafidain Bank, 15 F.3d 238, 242 (2d Cir. 1994)).
212 I& (quoting Dibrell Bros. Tobacco, Inc. v. Rafidain Bank, No. 93-0993, 1994
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8271 (D.D.C.June 14, 1994)).
2 SCHREUER, supra note 60, at 60.
21 Borek Statement, supra note 49, at 12.
25 SeeJOHN F. MURPHY, STATE SUPPORT OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: LEGAL,
PoLmcAL, AND ECONOMIc DIMENSIONS 119 (1989) ("Such proceedings, moreover,
could result in retaliatory actions against the United States in the courts of other coun-
tries that might be inclined to define terrorism and state sponsorship of it quite differ-
ently from any definition appearing in U.S. legislation or adopted by U.S. courts."); see
also The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: Heating on S. 825 Before the Subcomm. on Courts
and Admin. Practice of the Senate Comm. on theJudiciaty, 103d Cong. 8 (1994) (statement
of Stuart Schiffer, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice)
[hereinafter Schiffer Statement] ("If other states were to expand the jurisdiction of their
own courts, they might sweep more broadly into areas which we consider to be prop-
erly immune from theirjurisdiction.").
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refuses to respond, such foreign courts may proceed ex parte as a
matter of reciprocity. Once such a judgment is rendered, American
property abroad could be subject to attachment in order to satisfy
these judgments.
From a mere personal perspective, proceeding ex parte does not
provide litigants with what they desire most-accountability and clo-
sure.27 This is not to suggest that if a foreign state were to appear in
the trial, it would throw itself upon the mercy of the court and dis-
close all the atrocities it committed. Yet, subjecting the foreign state
to the trial process in the United States and requiring it to appear be-
fore the court to answer for what has occurred provide significant
emotional and psychological benefits to the plaintiffs that simply do
not exist in the defaultjudgment process. Witnessing foreign officials
answering questions and undergoing cross examination helps these
families heal and puts a face on their children's torturers. By noting a
nation's default but proceeding without its participation, the court is
allowing the terrorist nation to add insult to injury.
Experiences at the trial level have also shown that some courts
seize upon the new amendments as a vehicle to expand the FSIA to
even greater impermissible lengths. Although the intent of the recent
amendments was remedial in nature,m courts have used the amend-
ments to further new and unspecified goals. A clear example of this
impermissible expansion is demonstrated by the Ratow court's award
of punitive damages against Iran.
The FSIA clearly states that a foreign sovereign that is "not enti-
tled to immunity under section 1605 or 1607 ... shall be liable in the
same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like
circumstances; but a foreign state except for an agency or instrumen-
tality thereof shall not be liable for punitive damages."29 Despite the
clarity of this language, the Thatow court reached a different conclu-
sion. Judge Lamberth noted that "a foreign state sponsor of terrorism
can still be indirectly liable for punitive damages under the principles
2"6 See Borek Statement, supra note 49, at 14 (noting that "[s]tates are generally reluc-
tant to enter into the domestic courts of another state to defend themselves against
charges of serious violations of law").
2 See Gerson, supra note 12 ("[Civil suits] give[] the victims of terrorism and their
families what they desire most-accountability, the opportunity to get the true facts out
in the open and thus to obtain closure to their own personal trials. ").
See supra Part II.D (noting that the recent amendments were enacted to rectify
the problem of invoking the noncommercial tort exception for acts of state-sponsored
terrorism).
2"9 28 U.S.C. § 1606 (1994).
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of respondeat superior and vicarious liability. 26 The court reasoned that
compensatory damages cannot possibly provide the "massive civil li-
ability"26' that the state-sponsored terrorism exception was designed to
provide. As a result, the court concluded that a punitive damage
award "in the amount of three times the Islamic Republic of Iran's
annual expenditure for terrorist activities is appropriate."
2 62
An award of punitive damages, however, undermines both the let-
ter and the intent of the FSLA. Not only does it flatly contradict the
clear statutory language of § 1606, but it also contradicts the intent of
the FSIA which was "not intended to affect the substantive law of li-
ability."265 Although no other court has followed the Flatow court's
lead,264 such an unwarranted expansion of the FSIA ultimately fore-
shadows what lies ahead.
C. Post-Trial Consequences
The most devastating consequences of civil suits pursuant to the
recent amendments occur during the post-trial phase: execution of
the judgments. Simply obtaining ajudgment against the foreign state
does not effectuate the amendments' desired goal of deterring future
acts of terrorism by imposing massive civil liability upon the foreign
nation.2 To achieve this goal, the judgments must be enforced. Al-
though supporters of the recent amendments claimed that "the impo-
sition of a default judgment will create pressure.., to settle the dis-
pute,"2 the recent cases decided pursuant to the terrorism exception
have demonstrated the complete inability of litigants to execute their
Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1, 25-26 (D.D.C. 1998); see also
Murphy, supra note 75, at 41 (describing the award of punitive damages as "[t]he most
notable and surprising aspect of the court's decision in Thatow").
'2' Ratow, 999 F. Supp. at 25; see also 144 CONG. REC. H1095 (daily ed. Mar. 11,
1998) (statement of Rep. Saxton) [hereinafter Saxton Statement] (stressing that the goal
of civil suits is to hit foreign nations where they hurt the most-in the pocketbook).
262 flatow, 999 F. Supp. at 34. Iran's annual expenditure for terrorist activities is
$75 million. See id.
m H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 12 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6610.
2U See Cicippio v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 18 F. Supp. 2d 62, 69 (D.D.C. 1998)
(noting the difficulty of awarding compensatory damages in the absence of punitive
damages but nonetheless denying an award of punitive damages); Alejandre v. Repub-
lic of Cuba, 996 F. Supp. 1239, 1249 (S.D. Fla. 1997) (assessing compensatory damages
against Cuba, but not punitive damages).
2'5 See Saxton Statement, supra note 261 (noting that the United States and its citi-
zens, as well as Congress and the court system, will not "rest easy until every act of ter-
rorism is stopped").
m Sofaer Statement, supra note 107, at 84.
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judgments through settlement or attachment. From intervention by
the U.S. government to complicated legal proceedings identifying
"state" assets, these recent decisions have shown that the 1996
amendments have created a right without a clear remedy.
Since Iran dismissed the damage award in Thatow as "politically-
motivated and 'totally lacking objectivity and credibility,' 267 any
chance of settlement with Iran appeared dismal. Consequently, the
Flatow family sought to take advantage of the FSIA's new liberal at-
tachment provisions20 The Flatows were able to identify Iranian as-
sets in the United States, including Iran's old embassy, ambassador's
residence, and a building once used by Iranian diplomats.2" Yet,
when the Flatows attempted to attach these properties, the United
States intervened and blocked the attachment.!"
The United States claimed that these properties are immune from
attachment due to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. 7
Pursuant to Article 22(3) of the Vienna Convention, "[t]he premises
of the mission [embassy], their furnishings and other property
thereof.., shall be immune from search, requisition, attachment or
execution. "2  Consequently, as a signatory to this convention, the
United States cannot permit the attachment of such property. The
United States, however, did not intervene solely to preserve the sacro-
sanct nature of diplomatic property. The United States also inter-
vened for a very serious practical reason: to protect the attachment of
26 jerseyan Seeks TopLevel Aid in Iran Suit, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, NJ), July 18, 1998,
at 6, available in 1998 WL 3431042 (quoting an unnamed source from Tehran).
6 See 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(7) (1994) (providing that the property of a foreign
state, regardless of whether the property was involved with the act upon which the
claim is based, is not immune from attachment in order to satisfy judgments pursuant
to the terrorism exception).
269 See 60 Minutes, supra note 1 (noting that these assets were frozen by the United
States after Iran seized the American embassy in Tehran in 1979).
2'0 See id. (noting that when Flatow's lawyer tried to seize those assets, federal gov-
ernment attorneys objected).
2' Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 500
U.N.T.S. 95 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. For a detailed analysis of the effect of
the Vienna Convention on diplomatic property, see Richard Siegler, Diplomatic Immu-
nity: Minimizing the Risks, N.Y.L.J.,July 5, 1995, at 3.
27 Vienna Convention, supra note 271, 500 U.N.T.S. at 108. These assets are also
protected by the 1980 Algiers Accord which ended the hostage crisis with Iran in 1981.
Pursuant to this agreement, the "fate of the frozen Iranian assets is to be determined
by a special tribunal." J. Scott Orr, Terror Victim's Award in. Limbo: US. Shields Iran, to
Dad's Surprise, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, NJ.), Oct. 21, 1998, at 1, available in 1998 WL
16968261.
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American properties abroad.27 State Department officials warned of
adverse reciprocal treatment abroad in enacting the 1996 amend-
ments. 274 The reciprocal effect on American property and interests
abroad has been a concern consistently asserted in opposition to pro-
posals amending the FSIA .
The practical result of U.S. intervention, from the perspective of
the victims' families, is that the United States has sided with the terror-
ist nation against them. 276 As Stephen Flatow recently said, "I find my-
self in the surreal position of being opposed by the State Department
in my attempts to enforce our judgment against Iranian assets located
in the United States."2 7  While some government attorneys have
commented that "'commitment to the rule of law should not be mis-
taken for weakness in the face of terrorist violence,"'278 for families
that have lost so much, the feeling of abandonment by their own gov-
ernment is a consequence that cannot be ignored.
27 9
Congress also believes that the United States has intervened on
behalf of the terrorist states. In response, Congress has enacted addi-
tional legislation in order to force the United States to aid in the re-
covery of these judgments.28 Senator Lautenberg, in an effort to help
273 See Terror Victim's Kin Citidzes Clinton Waiver, WASH. POST, Oct. 26, 1998, at A15
("If the United States permitted attachment of diplomatic properties, then other coun-
tries could retaliate, placing our embassies and citizens overseas at grave risk." (quot-
ing White House Statement)); 60 Minutes, supra note 1 (reportingJames Rubin of the
State Department as stating, "Diplomatic property must remain sacrosanct, or our em-
bassies and our people o-overseas will be subject to legal challenge, and their prop-
erty could be confiscated.").
24 See generally Schiffer Statemen4 supra note 255.
2n See i&. at 10 ("We should be aware that enlarging the category of property avail-
able for prejudgment attachment and execution in the United States... invites simi-
lar treatment by other countries where our assets may be located.").
2' See Miller & Mintz, supra note 221 (stating that Alisa Flatow's family perceives
the United States government as steadfast in its effort to block them from attaching the
Iranian embassy to satisfy the Flatows' judgment); cf. Johnson, supra note 199 (stating
that Terry Anderson expects the United States to resist his lawsuit against Iran for its
role in his captivity).
'n Stephen Flatow, Keep Fighting, JERUSALEM POST, Sept. 1, 1998, at 10. Flatow fur-
ther stated that "[t]he State Department stepped in on the side of the Iranians when
[his] attorneys asked the United States Marshall's Office in Washington, DC to seize
Iranian government real estate located in the US capital." Id.
278 Miller & Mintz, supra note 221 (quoting government lawyers in a statement to
the judge in the case).
M JeffJacoby, Clinton's Betrayal of Cuban-Aniericans, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 4, 1999, at
A27 ("How can you explain to a mother who has lost her son, a wife who has lost her
husband, that their own government is taking the murderers' side?" (quoting Maggie
Khuly, Armando Alejandre's sister)).
2" See 144 CONG. REC. H7418 (daily ed. Aug. 7, 1998) (statement of Rep. Saxton)
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exercise these judgments,"8 ' inserted section 117 into the Omnibus
Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of
1999.212 This section amends section 1610 of the FSIA, to permit any
property, including property frozen under other U.S. laws, to be "sub-
ject to execution or attachment in aid of execution of any judgment
relating to a claim for which a foreign state... is not immune under
[the terrorism exception] . This section includes a waiver, however,
which permits the President to "waive the [attachment] requirements
of this section in the interest of national security.' s4 President
Clinton exercised his waiver authority over the Flatows' proposed at-
tachment of diplomatic property when he signed the Omnibus Act
into law,' 85 claiming that "section 117 would place the United States in
breach of its international treaty obligations. It would put at risk the
protection we enjoy at every embassy and consulate throughout the
world by eroding the principle that diplomatic property must be pro-
tected regardless of bilateral relations."286 This waiver, in essence,
renders all other provisions of the Omnibus Act irrelevant since there
are no limitations or restrictions on the President's ability to waive the
("In other words, our State [andJustice Departments were] fighting against our efforts
to help the Flatow family cause a price to be paid by Iran .... In other words, our
government was protecting the rights of the State of Iran rather than the rights of the
Flatow family.... "); see also Alfonse M. D'Amato, Terrorists in Your Pay, N.Y. POST,
Sept. 16, 1998, at 35 ("In siding with Iran, the administration has cast its lot with a ter-
rorist regime with a long record of hostage-taking and killing Americans.").
28 See Daniel Kurtzman, Clinton Blocks Effort to Force Iran to Pay, N.J. JEWISH NEWS,
Oct. 29, 1998, at 11, available in 1998 WL 1139630 (detailing the circumstances sur-
rounding the passage of § 117 of the Treasury and General Government Appropria-
tions Act of 1999).
212 Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of
1999, Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 117, 112 Stat. 2681, 2681-491.
2" Id. This section also requires the Secretary of State and the Secretary of the
Treasury to "fully, promptly, and effectively assist anyjudgment creditor or any court
that has issued any such judgment in identifying, locating, and executing against the
property of that foreign state or any agency or instrumentality of such state" if re-
quested by anyjudgment creditor. Id.
2 Id. § 117(d), 112 Stat. at 2681-492; see also Tony Snow, Will Bill Fight Any Terror-
ists, N.Y. POST, Sept. 25, 1999, at 17 (acknowledging that Secretary of State Madeline
Albright demanded "that the president could waive the statute when vital national-
security interests were at stake").
2" "Determination to Waive Requirements Relating to Blocked Property of Terror-
ist-List States," Presidential Determination No. 99-1 of Oct. 21, 1998, 3 C.F.R. § 302
(1999) ("I hereby determine that the requirements of section 117... would impede
the ability of the President to conduct foreign policy in the interest of national secu-
rity .... I hereby waive the requirements of section 117 in the interest of national se-
curity.").
Statement on Signing the Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental
Appropriations Act, 1999, 34WEEKLYCoMP. PREs. Doc. 2108 (Oct. 23, 1998).
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attachments in the interests of national security. It is axiomatic that
the attachment of property of a designated state sponsor of terrorism
will always threaten national security. All terrorist nations are a threat
to national security. If such a nation were not a threat to national se-
curity, it would not have been so designated as a terrorist state.
Even when diplomatic property is not the subject of a post-
judgment attachment, recent cases demonstrate that execution of any
judgment will inevitably result in prolonged, complex legal actions
that will deny families closure for years to come. After securing a
judgment against Cuba, the litigants in Alejandre attempted to execute
their judgment against debts owed to Cuba by telecommunications
companies. s The defendant telecommunication companies objected
to the writ of garnishment, arguing that they were indebted to Em-
presa de Telecommunicaciones de Cuba ("ETECSA"), a separate en-
tity from the Cuban government.L28 Under international public law,
"separate juridical entities which are distinct from a sovereign are rou-
tinely presumed to enjoy independent status, despite the fact that they
may operate openly as governmental instrumentalities."2 9 The court
concluded that the debts were owed to ETECSA and not to the gov-
ernment of Cuba.2" The court held ETECSA responsible for the gov-
ernment's debt, nevertheless, on the ground that a contrary holding
"would prevent Plaintiffs from collecting their court-ordered final
judgment... [and] would override the clear legislative policy... in
favor of broadening the property which may be executed to compen-
sate" victims of terrorist attacks. 9 The court deemed the injustice
that would result if ETECSA were treated as a separable legal entity as
sufficient to overcome the presumption of independent status. The
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit vacated the lower court's
judgment, 3 concluding that ETECSA enjoys a separate juridical status
27 See Alejandre v. Republic of Cuba, 42 F. Supp. 2d 1317, 1325 (S.D. Fla. 1999).
The plaintiffs filed a motion pursuant to Rule 69(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure requesting a writ of garnishment against several defendants including: AT&T,
AT&T of Puerto Rico, Telefonica Larga Distancia de Puerto Rico, MCI International,
the Chase Manhattan Corporation, and the Citigroup Inc. See id. at 1326.
2" See id. at 1326-27 (enumerating the main arguments put forward by the defen-
dant companies in opposition to garnishment).
2'9 EPSTEIN ETAL., supra note 155, § 7.03(l) (b).
2' SeeAlejandre, 42 F. Supp. 2d at 1335-36.
29 Id. at 1339.
See id. at 1337, 1339 (noting that the presumption of independent status may be
overcome to prevent fraud or injustice).
23 SeeAlejandre v. Telefonica Larga Distancia de Puerto Rico, Inc., 183 F.3d 1277,
1290 (11th Cir. 1999) (vacating the judgment of the district court and remanding to
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from Cuba.29 4 The court acknowledged that the presumption that a
governmental instrumentality enjoys independent legal status can be
overcome by a showing of injustice, but held that "concern about the
injustice of preventing plaintiffs from collecting their judgment" is in-
sufficient to set aside the presumpton. 5
Similar litigation has occurred in the Flatow case. After the Fla-
tows were denied attachment of Iran's diplomatic property in Wash-
ington, D.C., Stephen Flatow sought to attach property, allegedly
296owned by Iran, in Maryland. The owner of record for the property,
however, is the Alavi Foundation, a non-profit foundation incorpo-
rated in New York.29 7 Flatow argued that because the foundation is ex-
tensively controlled by Iran, it is an instrumentality of Iran and, con-
sequently, the court should lift the presumption of separate
existence.9 s  Furthermore, Flatow argued that "'American courts
should permit enforcement of [state-sponsored terrorism] judgments
against non-parties to the underlying litigation when there is evidence
that a judgment debtor owns covert property interests in the United
States which have been sheltered in an outwardly independent third
party.,,,m
The court denied Flatow's motion for several reasons. First, a
corporation is deemed to be a "citizen" of any State in which it is in-
corporated.s° Yet, the FSIA explicitly states that an "'agency or in-
strumentality of a foreign state"' does not include "a citizen of a State
of the United States." ' Since the Alavi Foundation is a citizen, it is
not an instrumentality of Iran and thus cannot be held liable for
Iran's debt.0 2 Second, even if the Foundation were an instrumentality
of Iran, it is entitled to a presumption of independence from its sov-
dissolve the writ of garnishment).
2 See id. at 1288 (rejecting plaintiffs' arguments that the presumption of inde-
pendent status was properly disregarded).
2" See id. at 1286-87 (noting that such concern would be present in every case in
which the plaintiff tries to hold a government instrumentality responsible for the debts
of a government).
m SeeFlatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 67 F. Supp. 2d 535, 537 (D. Md. 1999).
See id at 538 (noting that its formation under the laws of the State of New York
make it a citizen of New York).
m See id. at 540 (arguing that the evidence "strongly suggests" that the Alavi Foun-
dation is a "de facto instrumentality" of Iran).
Id at 539 (quoting Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition, at 18).
See id. at 538 (construing 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (1) (1994)).
28 U.S.C. § 1603(b) (1994); see also l'Yatow, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 538 (quoting the
language of the statute).
302 See 11atow, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 538.
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ereign.' 3 The court ultimately concluded that Flatow did not over-
come this presumption.! Finally, the court was unwilling to adopt
Flatow's public policy argument of construing the execution standards
of the FSIA to haul third party entities into court when there is proof
that the foreign sovereign has some "interest" in the entity.30 5 Such an
unprecedented course of action would unduly burden third parties
and should not be adopted absent a clear manifestation of legislative
intent."0 '
The Flatows are still seeking to execute their judgment. On No-
vember 15, 1999, Judge Lamberth, the same judge that awarded the
Flatows their $247.5 million judgment,0 7 granted the United States'
motion to quash a writ of attachment against "all credits held by the
United States to the benefit of the Islamic Republic of Iran.""' The
court reached this conclusion by finding that the money held by the
United States, which was awarded to Iran by the Iran-U.S. Claims Tri-
bunal, was the property of the United States!"l Having made this de-
termination, the court held that the suit was, in essence, a suit against
the United States, and consequently, absent an express waiver, sover-
eign immunity bars such suitL ° Judge Lamberth, after ignoring the
FSIA's prohibition on the award of punitive damages and awarding
such damages to the Flatows, ironically concluded that the "court
must remain faithful to its proper role within our constitutional sys-
tem, which requires courts to follow the rule of law, not their own in-
dividual conceptions of what is fair and just" and granted the U.S.'s
motion to quash the attachment.3 '
The Flatow family returned to court in December, 1999 and at-
'' See First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S.
611, 626-28 (1983) (concluding that duly-created government instrumentalities are
entitled to a presumption of independentstatus).
See Flatow, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 540-43 (finding that Flatow failed to demonstrate
that Iran exercises day-to-day control over the Foundation or that regarding it as a
separate entity would work fraud or injustice).
See i& at 539 (harmonizing § 1605 (a) (7) of the FSIA with existing FSIA law).
"6 See id. (stating "[t]here is nothing in the language of the provision itself, or the
legislative history that indicates that Congress intended 28 U.S.C. Section 1605 (a) (7)
to be interpreted differently") (citation omitted).
" Seesupra notes 215-25 and accompanying text (reviewing the damage award).
Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 74 F. Supp. 2d 18, 19 (D.D.C. 1999).
Id. at 20 ("[C]ontrolling authority dictates the finding that the Treasury funds
are U.S. property.").
310 See id. ("[S]overeign immunity bars their attachment here, as neither the Ira-
nian Assets Control Regulations nor the [FSIA] contain a clear and unequivocal waiver
of the United States' immunity.").
s" Id. at 26.
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tempted to levy a writ of attachment against three parcels of real estate
owned by the Islamic Republic of Iran, including the former embassy
and two NationsBank accounts containing funds generated by the
State Department's lease of these properties. Since the property was
part of the former Iranian Embassy, the court concluded that the use
of the real property was sovereign, not commercial, in nature."3 As
such, the property was immune from attachment314 Finally, the court
concluded that the two accounts were also immune from attachment
since one constituted property of the United States31 5 and the other
was not commercial in nature since it related to payment of mainte-
nance and repair expenses of the Iranian mission in the United
316States. Having quashed this third attempt to execute the Flatow
judgment, even Judge Lamberth concluded that "Flatow's original
judgment against Iran has come to epitomize the phrase 'Pyrrhic vic-
tory. "'
1 7
On the same day, Judge Lamberth quashed the Flatows' fourth
and most recent attempt to execute their judgment.31 8 Here, the Fla-
tows sought to attach an arbitration award issued in favor of Iran by
the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal.1 9 Since this award was issued
over twelve years ago, Judge Lamberth concluded that the "statute of
limitations for confirming the award has expired, [and] neither Iran
nor anyone purporting to act on its behalf has cognizable or enforce-
able property rights in this award."32 Consequently, this fourth and
most recent attempt ultimately failed as well.
These recently decided cases demonstrate the inevitable conse-
quences in the post-trial phase of suits brought pursuant to the recent
amendments. By not requiring the property subject to attachment to
312 See Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 76 F. Supp. 2d 16, 18-20 (D.D.C. 1999)
(setting forth the facts of the case).
See id. at 22-23 (relying on authority holding that use of property for diplomatic
purposes is not commercial activity as a matter of law).
34 See id. at 18 (noting such "properties and accounts are immune from attach-
ment under the [ESIA]").
3 See id. at 24 (explaining that, as U.S. property, sovereign immunity bars its at-
tachment).
316 See id. ("[T]he United States' preservation and protection of the proper-
ties ... is a sovereign act.").
317 Id. at 27.
3'8 Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 76 F. Supp. 2d 16 (D.D.C. 1999).
"9 See FMC Corporation v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 292-353-2 (Iran-
United States Claims Tribunal Feb. 12, 1987) for background on the money, property,
and credits FMC Corp. owes to Iran as a result of the Tribunal's award.
20 Id. at 2.
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have any connection to the underlying cause of action, diplomatic
property and unrelated private property located in the United States
will be the subject of lawsuits for years to come. When diplomatic
property is seized, the United States will undoubtedly intervene on
behalf of the sacrosanct nature of diplomatic property 21 On the
other hand, when private property is the subject of attachment, inno-
cent third parties will be hauled into court and forced to defend
themselves. Forcing victims' families to exercise their judgments in
such a piecemeal fashion, without the cooperation of the United
States, compels these families to relive their personal tragedies on a
daily basis. The end result is that recent litigants know, prior to filing
suit, that even if they receive a judgment in their favor, execution of
that judgment and the closure that accompanies it will rarely, if ever,
occur.3s Such a drastic consequence has even led The Washington Post
to conclude that the 1996 amendments are a "lie" and should never
have been passed. ts
CONCLUSION
While it is beyond the scope of this Comment to develop a solu-
tion for the problems created by the 1996 amendments to the FSIA,
some lessons can be gleaned from both the theory and practice of the
private civil suit. From a theoretical perspective, these amendments
demonstrate the extraordinary lengths Congress will go to when con-
fronted with a situation over which it feels powerless to change.
32 4
While state-sponsored terrorism is one of the most insidious forms of
violence and violates every convention of international law,325 the 1996
amendments destroy the careful balance between sovereign immunity
321 60 Minutes, supra note 1 ("Diplomatic property must remain sacrosanct...."
(quotingJames Rubin, Spokesman of the State Department)).
s2 See Miller, supra note 199 ("If we get anything it will be years away." (quoting
Terry Anderson)).
S"2 Editorial, Lawsuits and Terrorism, WASH. PoST, Dec. 26, 1999, at B6 ("Congress
never should have passed, nor President Clinton signed, a law that could only offer Mr.
Flatowjustice by depriving the administration of control over important instruments of
foreign policy. This law should be repealed.").
s2' See Senator Connie Mack, Letter to the Editor, For Victims of Teror, WASH. POST,
Nov. 6, 1999, at A24 (articulating dissatisfaction with the Clinton Administration's re-
sistance to help successful litigants execute theirjudgments).
S-2 See Statement for the Record of Louis j Free, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigations
Before the Subcomm. for the Depts. of Commerce, Justice, and the State, the Judiciay, and Related
Agencies of the Sen. Comm. on Appropiations (Feb. 4, 1999), available in 1999 WL 58450
(F.D.C.H.); see also MURPn, supra note 255, at 58 ("There is no doubt that state-
sponsored terrorism violates international law.").
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and domestic jurisdiction that Congress struck when it first enacted
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. By enacting the FSIA, Con-
gress sought to provide uniform, carefully delineated, and apolitical
exemptions from the presumption of immunity.3 2 The recent legisla-
tion, however, does not reflect the same careful deliberation. By re-
moving any jurisdictional nexus, ignoring due process concerns, and
re-injecting political considerations into determinations of immunity,
the 1996 amendments drastically deviate from the steady course Con-
gress has forged.
From a practical perspective, the 1996 amendments confirm that
the privatization of the war on terrorism has failed. Stephen Flatow
felt empowered by the Flatow Amendment. He commented that the
127law gave him a weapon. Yet, the practical consequences of such pri-
vate suits demonstrate that this weapon is completely ineffective, espe-
cially when placed in the wrong hands. State-sponsored terrorism is
an international problem that affects a multitude of players. As such,
only an international response is appropriate. We must look to inter-
national organizations, such as the United Nations, which stand in the
unique position of providing a proper forum for redress. The State
Department, in opposition to the recent amendments, urged Con-
gress to use the United States's position as "a leader at the UN and
elsewhere in marshalling international efforts to combat state-
sponsored terrorism.
2
Furthermore, while the initial suits were brought to provide clo-
sure and accountability to the families, and to deter terrorist nations
from sponsoring terrorist attacks, the recent judgments rendered pur-
suant to the 1996 amendments demonstrate that the private suit is a
futile weapon in effectuating either result. For the victims' families,
the recent suits, which have all resulted in default judgments, have
failed to provide any accountability. Even the small glimmer of clo-
sure that successful litigants receive from their victories in court have
proven specious in light of the reality of endless litigation and the U.S.
government's resistance to executing judgments. Such protracted
litigation and the sense of abandonment it engenders have denied any
real closure. As one commentator initially observed, "[t]he ultimate
test of success [of the private civil suit] will, of course, lie in the courts.
3" See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text (explaining the congressional pur-
pose behind the law).
"2' See 60 Minutes, supra note 1 ("[The law] gave me a weapon. ... I have American
jurisdiction over the people who sponsored the terrorist attack which killedAlisa.").
3' Borek Statewwn4 supra note 49, at 12.
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A right after all, is only as good as its exercise."32n The recent deci-
sions, along with the concomitant inability to execute the judgments,
indicate that the 1996 amendments have clearly created a right with-
out a remedy.
The theoretical implications, coupled with the practical conse-
quences of the private suit, require reexamining the propriety of such
a course of action. The private suit has truly come to epitomize a Pyr-
rhic victory. While these families might be winning the battles in the
courtroom, we are still losing the war against terrorism. The devastat-
ing consequences of the private suit even prompted Stephen Flatow to
say, "If I knew then what I know [now], after spending tens of thou-
sands of dollars trying to get some measure ofjustice for Alisa, I don't
think I would have started this lawsuit."3 From the Flatows and the
other families touched by the horrors of terrorism-denied account-
ability and forced to relive their tragedies on a daily basis-to the
drastic effect the recent amendments have had on the development of
sovereign immunity, experiences with the private suit have demon-
strated that the cost of closure is a high price-one that no individual
American can afford to pay.
s2 Gerson, supra note 12.
Brian Blomquist, Grieving Dad: Prez Boosts Tenor, N.Y. POST, Sept. 27, 1999, at
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